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

Emergence of the Dual State

ALAN WOLFE

'Two Ups, Two Downs'

On Keeping a Revolution

Thomas I. Emerson

ST

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LETTERS

tactical victory

Los Angeles, Calif.

"HUAC Shelved" [editorial, *The Nation*, Feb. 1], correctly qualifies the victory won in the House of Representatives on January 14 when the House Internal Security Committee (HISC, formerly HUAC) was eliminated as a Standing Committee.

Our long-sought goal of *abolishing* HUAC/HISC will not have been reached until the words, "Communist and other subversive activities," transferred to the Judiciary Committee in a desperate final act by the doomed HISC leadership, are utterly excised from the investigating mandate of the Congress, and the voluminous HUAC/HISC files have been sealed in the Archives.

At this point it is worth noting that the first Congressional "Un-American" Committee, established forty-five years ago under Rep. Hamilton Fish, was given the identical authority to investigate "Communism in the United States" that the House transferred to the Judiciary on January 14.

While properly proclaiming the tremendous practical victory won over HUAC/HISC, Rep. Robert Drinan enunciated in the *Congressional Record* the essential warning against the transfer wording substituted by HISC's Ichord:

> That language places within the jurisdiction of the House Judiciary Committee the duty of investigating and legislating with respect to "Communist" activities which are stated to be subversive. This language raises, of course, a fundamental issue of the First Amendment in that it places within the Rules of the House of Representatives the conclusion that the "Communist" Party in the United States is "subversive."

• • •

Another era, another time, another Congress can seize upon such words and launch anew the witch hunting processes. . . .

The National Committee Against Repressive Legislation wishes to thank *The Nation* for its accolades for our "fifteen years of hard work" for the tactical victory over HUAC/HISC. Because of the role we have endeavored to play we are especially mindful that such victories are not won by one organization but by a coalition of many . . . not by the Democrats you fairly identify for their leading role on January 14 but by bipartisan support of more than forty Republicans who joined the battle. Above all, the victory was won by tens of thousands of individual citizens who wrote their letters and gave of their often limited means. . . .

Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director-Field Representative
National Committee Against Repressive Legislation

a question on Bentsen

Stanford, Calif.

Joseph Goulden's fine article, "Bentsen: Money Man from Texas" [*The Nation*, Mar. 8] failed to mention evidence regarding Bentsen's role in the notorious Sharpstown financial scandal which brought down top members of the Texas political establishment in 1970-71. Nixon's Justice Department at the time displayed a remarkable unwillingness to seek federal indictments in the case, and Assistant Attorney General Wilson was forced to resign thanks to his connection with the case.

According to retired Republican U.S. Attorney J.P. Farris, top Justice Department officials blocked his attempts to bring indictments against Texas officials. And it was Senator Bentsen who blocked Farris' reappointment for a second four-year term. In an interview with *The New York Times* (Dec. 31) Farris also accused Bentsen of lying with regard to his handling of the case. Mr. Farris' charges may well prove unfounded, but they should be fully investigated before the Democrats consider Bentsen as a Presidential candidate.

Jonathan Marshall

Cover illustration: Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)

EDITORIALS

The Other Government

Behind the Watergate scandals looms an issue of perhaps greater long-term importance: the challenge presented to a democratic society by disclosures of widespread corruption, irresponsibility, unethical behavior and criminal conduct on the part of top-level corporate management. Watergate was concerned with the abuse of official government powers, but large corporations, as "private governments," exercise powers of comparable scope and importance. In theory, and perhaps in practice, we can prevent in the future such gross abuses of government power as occurred in the Watergate scandals, but just how do we propose to cope with the abuse of vast corporate power? A few illustrations, drawn from the news of recent weeks, point up the issue:

¶ Two U.S. airlines—Braniff and American—have been charged with illegally siphoning $1.2 million into secret political funds, falsifying their books and records, "laundering" the funds and, by inference, convincing the appropriate regulatory agency not to take action.

¶ Ashland Oil Co. not only made large illegal campaign contributions through various guises but recently paid $2 million in damages, including punitive damages of $1.5 million, for a bizarre "boatnapping" in Florida that had the overtones of a Mafia operation.

¶ Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., with about 80,000 employees and annual sales of nearly $3 billion, disbursed a half-million-dollar illegal political slush fund to candidates in local, state and national campaigns. Corporate funds were siphoned off to Swiss bank accounts in the guise of payments for various fictitious claims and the cash was then quietly withdrawn and returned to St. Paul. In one instance, the corporation claimed a tax deduction based on a bogus insurance premium for a $115,000 item doled out to candidates.

¶ More recently, Gulf Oil Corp. has been charged with falsifying its records to hide the existence of a $10 million secret political fund. Again a series of tricky maneuvers was used to launder the funds. Gulf, be it noted, is one of "the seven sisters," the seven largest international oil companies. It has assets of more than $12 billion, 52,700 employees and reported revenues of $4.5 billion in 1974. Other examples would not be hard to find.

It must be emphasized not merely that these large "private governments" violated the law, but that the managements in each instance showed that they knew they were acting illegally, unethically and irresponsibly by the devious ways in which political funds were first "laundered" and then distributed. The implications scarcely require emphasis, but a few may be noted. In some instances, as in the case of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., levies were made on the salaries of individual officers to raise secret political funds, but usually corporate funds were tapped—that is, funds were taken directly from the corporate till. Ultimately these funds belonged to the shareholders. In some cases, too, managements have been accused of not reporting the full facts to the shareholders even after the improper conduct had been disclosed. Ethi-

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cally the actions were indefensible. At the very least, there was a breach of the trust relationship which top officials should occupy in relation to shareholders and, in some respects, to employees who, after all, are important cogs in the corporate wheel. Not only that, but key officials were in a position to coerce the conduct of junior officials. Other implications might be noted, but these should suffice to indicate the morass of misconduct, irresponsibility and criminal behavior involved.

The real issue is this: how can such corporate managements be adequately punished and properly "policed" so as to insure compliance with the law? Fines are ridiculous. Not only have those levied been minimal but, in most instances, management employment contracts contain a clause that indemnifies the officer against claims, damages and fines arising out of his execution of corporate policy. What kind of restraint is it to fine Gulf $5,000 and its consultant $1,000 in a social context in which the guilt of management officials is the subject of sympathetic commiseration in the mass media? (See *Time*'s account of "the poignant" situation in which directors of the 3M Company find themselves—March 24.) Asking an official to step down is in practice absurd, since the official usually reappears as chairman of the board after having resigned as president. Gulf recently—and quietly—rehired the Washington consultant and vice president who resigned a year ago after Gulf had tried to unload on him responsibility for its criminal misconduct. Corporate officials can perhaps be compelled to reimburse the corporation for all funds paid out illegally, but that hardly insures that the offense will not be repeated. Revoking government licenses—as in the case of the airlines—is hardly appropriate. Antitrust laws, in some instances, might be invoked. Moral censure, with a colossus like Gulf, is meaningless. The likelihood of indignant customers boycotting its products will not cause management any loss of sleep. Electing new boards of directors who might or might not employ new management does not get at the real issue. The fact is that government and the courts can exercise only a limited control of these huge "private" entities. Government can tax them. It can fine them. It can require nominal compliance with certain forms. It can hale the officers into court or before Congressional committees. But such actions represent about the limit of its powers. Regulatory agencies, as arms of Congress, are mostly influenced or controlled by the corporations they are supposed to regulate. Given extreme provocation, nationalization could be invoked as a remedy for persistent abuse of corporate powers but less drastic measures would have to be tried first.

It is idle to exhort the stockholders to be more vigilant; dividends are their prime concern. Class actions are of some help and so are proxy campaigns. But obviously different methods must be tried. One would be to place public representatives on the boards of corporations of a certain magnitude, an innovation that would probably require federal charters for corporations. Another would be to insist on better—that is, more complete and detailed—reports not only to employees and stockholders but to government agencies and the press. Still a third would be to vest employees, particularly junior officers, with some form of job insurance in case they should blow the whistle

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on improper conduct. (Professional societies—accountants and bar associations—might be induced to take action against corporate officers who had violated the law, but not all such officers belong to professional societies.)

Involved in the general problem, it should be noted, is a wide range of corporate decision making that has profound social and ethical implications—ecological problems, for example—but which do not imply illegal conduct per se. The situation and some possible approaches to it are cogently discussed in Christopher D. Stone's important study, *Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior*, to be published this summer. But without further debate or delay, one conclusion seems justified: Congress should undertake an immediate ongoing study of how "private governments" can, by democratic means, be induced to act legally, responsibly and ethically. In a way, the issue overshadows illegal actions by high government officials; on them we can, sometimes, lay hands, as Watergate proved, but bringing "private governments" into line is a problem of ever greater complexity and magnitude, if only because the means of exercising effective social control have yet to be determined.

'Spook Words'

An executive of the Association of American Railroads tells us, "Nationalization is a sort of spook word," and goes on to defend the proposed government rehabilitation and ownership of the country's ailing rail tracks. "I don't consider the trucking industry nationalized because the government owns the highways," the industry executive said to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. He added that he doesn't consider the barge industry nationalized because the government runs the inland waterways. He might have added the airline industry, which profits from government administration of airlanes.

Once again, it's industry bailout time and the corporate Socialists have a contagious case of the "gimmes." Rather than let the owners of the Penn Central and other bankrupt railroads in the Northeast pay for their mismanagement—and let the creditors take their losses—as the rationale for the free enterprise system says they should, yet another government-financed agency, the United States Railway Association, has proposed sinking what outsiders predict might turn out to be upward of $10 billion into rehabilitation of the bankrupt lines. A return to profitability is said to be the eventual goal. To accomplish that, the USRA has suggested that some form of roadbed nationalization might be the best solution. It is called "nationalization with a Chamber of Commerce label," and the industry seems at least open to it. *Business Week* thinks it's a good idea. *The Wall Street Journal* says it "may be the best Hobson's choice" available. To us it sounds more like citrus socialism, with the corporate interests skimming off the wealth and the people getting only the lemons.

The USRA has at least made a positive recommendation that provides or should provide a basis for sensible debate, something government commissions have not always been able to do. Yet any nationalization proposal that is endorsed by corporate interests deserves at least a hard look. And when its chief sponsor, Arthur D. Lewis, the head of the USRA, is a former president of Eastern Airlines—no stranger to government subsidy—and says government financing of roadbeds is "the only way to avoid nationalization of the rail industry," skepticism is but a starting point for analysis.

Because they are such a valuable national asset, and represent a tool for considerable energy saving, a restructuring and preservation of the faltering lines is essential. America is one of the few nations in the world whose rail transportation is privately run. But whatever the problems endemic to authentic nationalization by a corporation-dominated administration in Washington, they do not match those inevitable in any partial bailout intervention. As long as current management is retained, as long as the operation is still beholden to the private interests who let it be ruined in the first place, as long as the nationalization is restricted to those elements of the operation that have already fallen into near-total decay, the prospects for efficient public service are not bright.

Furthermore, in the current economic, social and political environment, with private contractors greedily feeding from the federal trough, it is likely that a partial nationalization of the railroad industry—and concomitant roadbed rebuilding—would be shoddily carried out, with ineptness and inefficiency standard operating procedure, as it seems to be in the armaments industry. For years the railroads have been a source of easy pickings for various corporate vultures that feed on government subsidy and favorable regulation. Only in the atmosphere of a national publicly administered rail reconstruction could work have a chance to proceed free of the social irresponsibility condoned by much free enterprise ideology. Such a national effort would stimulate the economy and provide jobs.

Because it is so attractive as an economic boon, rebuilding the roadbeds may be necessary even within prevailing corrupt norms and within current bailout economic psychology if the alternative is continued inaction and deterioration. A *New York Times* headline has advised us that "Nationalize" is "The Dirty Word on U.S. Railroads." The *Times* has quoted Toby Moffett, a first-term U.S. Representative from Connecticut as saying: "I don't believe there is anything sinister in the word 'nationalization.' In my district I hear lots of people say, 'Take 'em over and run 'em right.' "

'None of the Above'

The liberal Democrats met recently in Chicago to see if they could agree on a program and perhaps a candidate but adjourned without agreement on either. Some stressed the importance of firming up a set of issues which might then attract an acceptable candidate. Others, frightened by their experience in 1972, thought it unwise to overstress issues. Some thought that their colleagues were too finicky about a candidate: "If Jesus Christ were resurrected," one said, "some of you would find him unsatisfactory." Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. let it be known that he was "against everybody in the race." Indeed if there was a preference it seemed to be for "none of the above." Favorite sons were discussed but with no great enthusiasm. Some delegates expressed the hope that "a late bloomer"

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would appear at convention time, say Muskie or Humphrey or McGovern. But the first two, it should be noted, will be up for re-election to the Senate in 1976, and while Senator McGovern could be drafted, he does not fancy himself a late bloomer. And then there were delegates, of course, who hoped that Senator Kennedy might burst into full bloom at the convention. All in all, the conference did little to settle the dilemma which brought the delegates together; actually they could agree on a program without much trouble, but it is the absence of a candidate that baffles them. But the conference rates one affirmative statement. It brought together the veterans of the Eugene McCarthy-Robert Kennedy-George McGovern campaigns, now organization-wise, seasoned activists with experience in many states, and they were meeting as a caucus within the party a year in advance of the convention. That, at least, is the start of wisdom but offers slight comfort. For the liberal huddle at the Flying Carpet Motor Inn was itself more evidence of the great political vacuum that exists as the nation looks ahead to a critical Presidential election in the year of the Bicentennial.

Open the File

For three years Allen Weinstein of Smith College, with the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union, has been trying to gain access to the FBI files in the case of Alger Hiss. While some material has been released, it has been heavily edited and, for all practical purposes, Weinstein is still a petitioner, knocking on a door that will not open. A recent development should prompt the new Attorney General, Edward Levi, a man of conscience and integrity, to issue orders making the twenty-five-year-old file available for inspection. To understand the relevance of the new development a word of background is necessary. The famous Woodstock typewriter was produced at the trial by the Hiss defense. But some years later Richard M. Nixon, in *Six Crises*, let slip the information that it had been found first by the authorities. After *The Nation* called attention to this remarkable admission, the then Vice President's staff issued a statement attributing it to faulty research. But in the Watergate tapes Nixon boasted to associates that, with the aid of two "stupid but tenacious" HUAC investigators, he had found the typewriter without the aid of the FBI. Recently *The Real Paper*, Boston (March 12), carried an interview which Peter Irons conducted with an unnamed source "able to reveal the top-level, carefully guarded operations of Hoover and the FBI"—a man with thirty years' experience "in the intelligence field." The interview has the ring of authenticity about it. According to the anonymous former official, "the FBI did have the typewriter" before it was found by the Hiss defense. Some sixty FBI agents had been searching for it. He is not certain, however, whether it was located by the FBI or brought to the bureau by Nixon. As *The Nation* has pointed out before, several newspapers reported at the time that the FBI had found the typewriter or had had it in their possession. That the FBI clings to the file so tenaciously suggests that it might contain information which would help Hiss establish his innocence. Under the circumstances, the Attorney General should insist that the file be opened for inspection.

The Dixie-Mafia Connection

While local/state autonomy from federal interference is often a valid cause—especially when federal policy has been molded to serve private interests—illegal interstate commerce can be halted only by regulation from Washington.

With the obvious exceptions of Alaska and Hawaii, and those few states with agricultural border inspections, dividing lines between the states have become increasingly meaningless for the national trading community. Smuggling of contraband has become routine. Cigarettes, for example, are universally salable. Everywhere in the country a cigarette is a cigarette is a cigarette . . . the only difference is price. State and local taxes can nearly double the cost of cigarettes and have in some cases, notably New York City. Fortunes can be made by buying truckloads of cigarettes in North Carolina, Virginia or Kentucky and then selling them in New York and other high-tax areas. According to *Newsday*, New York State and City lose an estimated $133 million in tax revenues each year, much of it eventually lining Mafia pockets. One might suspect that organized crime interests are behind the Balkanized tax structures. If they are not, they should be.

This not only costs states and cities money; it has cost some wholesalers in the high-tax states their businesses and, for those who have survived, soaring hijack-insurance premiums. By encouraging smuggling, the tax differentials lead to actual strong-arm crime (there's a reason for those high hijacking premiums and gang raids are not unknown). The Mafia's enterprises are funded. Workers in the high-tax states have lost their jobs.

Only a national, uniform tax with at most a few cents of local/state additional levy could begin to solve the problem. Smokers who deal with the smugglers, and those who live in states with minimal taxes, of course have been saving money with the current system. But that hardly compensates for the other losses. If the cigarette tax is found to be regressive, national legislation could take that into account in setting the amount.

The situation is not at all dissimilar to that involving handguns. In certain Southern states they are about as easy to buy as cheap cigarettes, and everywhere are at least as dangerous. Illegal interstate trafficking in handguns is probably a bigger business than cigarette smuggling. In both cases, citizens in certain Southern states have become the functional allies of Yankee gangsters, sharing in the booty caused by lack of needed nationwide control.

'Foreign Correspondent'

There was magic to the moniker. For the two decades that divided the century's two World Wars, foreign correspondents were our national explorers, venturing into nations and controversies previously unknown to a country that felt secure in its geographic isolation. Filling out shadow impressions with first-hand reporting, they would travel and report and return laden with anecdotes for a lecture tour timed to coincide with publication of their latest book. Provincialism had real meaning in America in

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those years. With their accounts of a world afflicted with war, revolution and turmoil, the best of foreign correspondents were effective agents for internationalist concern.

Edgar Snow, Louis Fischer, Walter Davenport, Dorothy Thompson, John Gunther, William Shirer, Howard K. Smith, Carleton Beals, Leland Stowe, Mark Gayn, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong . . . and, of course, Vincent Sheean, perhaps the most romantic of them all, who died last week at 75. Sheean's best-known book, his *Personal History* (1935), was more than a journalist's memoir. It had an appeal, an interest difficult to name in a world forty years different. It may have lacked the importance of Edgar Snow's reporting of the Chinese revolution, or of Carleton Beals's ventures into Central and South America, but it worked superbly in its own way as compelling autobiography infused with a sense of its time, what was happening then and what would be happening soon. Sheean, the others named, and several more not mentioned —the whole group of inter-war correspondents—well served their profession and the American public. A few, and here Sheean excelled, forged a new kind of politically committed personal journalism that has been, since that time, rarely approached more skillfully.

The disappearance of the free-lance foreign correspondent of the 1920s and 1930s is attributable to three factors. An increase in the number of foreign news bureaus is one; a decline in American provincialism is another. And since World War II, Americans, particularly students, have traveled abroad in unprecedented numbers, becoming amateur correspondents complete with their own photograph-illustrated stories. Then too, television, with its global reach, has demystified, if not deepened, the reporting of foreign news. Traveling reporters, although too often lazy carriers of cliché in their work, now can be there when it happens, transmitting the news instantaneously, making us on-the-spot spectators, only dimly reflecting the glamour of the old Marco Polos of the news.

Public Power: The Rand Study

James Rowen

Madison

Advocates of public ownership of power companies can take comfort in a report from The Rand Corporation, an unlikely source. In a little publicized 68-page document analyzing Los Angeles' forceful response to the energy crisis of the winter of 1973-74, Rand repeatedly emphasizes one point: municipal ownership of utilities is an invaluable tool for effecting meaningful conservation.

Los Angeles is the largest American city that operates a municipally owned utility, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). In November 1973, when scheduled shipments of Middle Eastern fuel oil, from which 60 per cent of the city's electricity is generated, were embargoed in North Africa, the city council adopted recommendations put forth by a blue-ribbon panel appointed by Mayor Thomas Bradley, and passed an ordinance establishing a no-nonsense plan. It called for a two-phase cutback of electricity. In Phase I, residential and industrial customers would reduce their usage 10 per cent, compared to the identical period a year earlier, and commercial customers would reduce 20 per cent. Phase II, planned for when the program was running smoothly, called for savings of 12 per cent by residential customers, 16 per cent by industrial users and 33 per cent by commercial customers. Failure to comply would result in a 50 per cent surcharge on the entire bill for the period of violation; repeated violations would cause a suspension of service.

Within five weeks of the December 21st starting date, the Rand study shows, citywide electrical usage was down 17 per cent, greater by 5 per cent than the target set by the LADWP. Some commercial businesses achieved reductions of 50 per cent, and most customers were able to make or exceed their expected conservation goals without great inconvenience. Phase II was never implemented, and the entire ordinance was suspended—not repealed—in May 1974. Subsequent studies show that, even with the quotas lifted, Los Angeles residents continued their new, conserving practices. Electrical consumption continued to be down 5 per cent to 10 per cent into the hot summer months, and there was little backsliding into formerly wasteful patterns of power usage.

After recording the successes of the Los Angeles program, Rand cites the importance of the speed with which the city responded to the emergency (only fifteen days elapsed between the date the city's oil failed to arrive in Italy from North Africa and the city council's unanimous passage of the curtailment ordinance), stating that "because LADWP is regulated by the city council, the council could respond rapidly with actions tailored to DWP's specific situation. Similar success elsewhere would depend on the speed and scope of action available to other regulating bodies."

The exact nature of future energy problems cannot be predicted, but most American communities and their utilities—whether publicly or privately owned—could easily face one or more kinds of emergency. More oil embargoes, generating or transmission equipment failures, capital shortages, plant siting hassles—any one or combination of these situations could place a utility in a crisis situation.

The Rand study was prepared at the request of the Federal Energy Administration. Was it only an academic exercise, an example of think-tank games playing, or is the report being studied in earnest by the FEA? Private utilities do not, of course, have the legislative power to impose severe quotas on their customers, nor in fact do the government agencies that oversee their operations. Furthermore, it goes against the instincts of a private

James Rowen is the administrative assistant to the Mayor of Madison, Wis., and a past contributor to The Nation.

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utility to teach real conservation, and the only way it likes to enforce a reduction of use is by imposing an equivalent increase of unit cost, with the predictable result that the poor customer suffers and the rich one is either oblivious or passes the cost along.

Private utility managers view suggestions of municipal ownership as a kind of blasphemy and fight back with pious ruthlessness. In Madison, Wis. two city council attempts since 1973 to establish a commission to study alternative forms of utility ownership were defeated by well-organized company lobbying. Other cities have seen attempts at public ownership defeated at the polls by massive utility-managed campaigns.

But the Rand report could be an entirely new factor in the public power movement, for it details the successful operation of a crucial conservation plan, and gives primary credit to the municipal structure of the utility running it. Now the question is, can the government, and some of our largest and most politicized private corporations, ignore the major implications of the study?

THE NAVAJOS

HIGH, DRY & PENNILESS

PHILIP RENO

Farmington, N.M.

The demands of national energy and the stringency of Western water are closing in on Mother Earth and Father Sky—the American Indian's resource endownment. Electric power generation and the manufacture of methane gas in the West will require tremendous quantities of coal and even greater quantities of water, relative to supply. Navajo Indian coal and water, along with the coal and water of Northern Cheyenne, Crow and a few other Indian tribes, are substantial components of government and corporate plans to increase the energy supply.

The energy corporations are well along to implementing plans which, as they stand, offer a quota of jobs and limited gains in tribal income for the short run. In the long run they threaten Indian survival—the survival of Indians as Indians. The Indians are moving to formulate their own plans for their own resources, and "how well the Indians play their cards in the energy game" may decide their future, as the Council on Economic Priorities points out in its report on coal leasing in the West. That report is entitled *Leased and Lost.*

Survival for the Indian comes down to the relationship between life and land. White Americans have always moved to new locations as resources were exhausted, but the survival of Indians as Indians depends on the survival of the tribe and the culture. And that in turn depends on there being Indian communities with an adequate resource base.

Three issues in "the energy game" are the keys to Indian survival: (*1*) protection of Indian water rights; (*2*) adequate economic returns for use of Indian resources; and (*3*) conservation of Indian culture and environment. Water determines practically all development in the West. Total Colorado River Basin water to be used in energy production will amount to 1.03 million acre-feet of water per year, according to *Environment* magazine. That is one-twelfth of the average total flow of water at the river's midway measuring station at Lee's Ferry, Ariz. Unless Indian water is expropriated, there simply is not enough water in the Colorado River Basin even to meet present commitments, much less to serve the planned energy expansion. In the phrase of noted water rights attorney William Veeder, the river is being forced into bankruptcy. Attempts by energy corporations and government agencies to appropriate Indian water and turn it over to energy development will, as they are now proceeding, close off a good part of the Indian future.

With regard to the second issue, the income which the Indians receive for their energy resources must be high enough to enable them to develop alternate sources of productive income for the time when the energy resource is exhausted or no longer economically accessible. Indian revenues for their coal, oil, gas and uranium are now far below this level of adequate returns. When the resources are economically exhausted, the corporations and the government will move on. Unless the Indians have meanwhile developed other means of livelihood, they will be left to make a living from land drained of resources and deprived of the water which could make it fruitful.

The third issue concerns the conservation of Indian culture and environment. The industrial and strip-mining operations involved in energy production are likely to shatter the fragile ecosystem in which Navajo and other Indian cultures are embedded. The Navajos are a marvelously adaptive people, if given the chance to develop their resources in their own way. Can their culture maintain itself, however, against the abrupt disruption which the projected, forced-draft energy production will bring to Navajo society—to the close family and extended family ties, the man-nature relationships and the spiritual and social values that give Navajo life its strength and meaning?

The five multi-megawatt coal-burning power plants now scattered around the Navajo Reservation burn Navajo coal and most of them use Navajo water. The Extra High Voltage lines that swing out from the plants carry power to Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque and Los Angeles. The majority of Navajo homes spanned by the EHV lines are lighted by lanterns and heated by wood stoves or by open

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fires in the middle of earthen floors. Only one in three Navajo homes has electric lights inside the home and only one in five has running water and inside plumbing. Navajo people have one-fourth the income and thus one-fourth the access to resource products that the rest of America enjoys. Navajo infant mortality is twice the U.S. average, Navajo unemployment ten times the national rate. These and other indexes of deprivation are mentioned from time to time in Congressional reports and regularly every four years in Presidential messages about Indian affairs.

The five plants now burning Navajo coal are only the beginning. Electrical power plants planned for the Colorado River Basin will generate 36,000 megawatts, more than the total power produced by TVA. Seven coal-gasification plants are projected for the northwestern Navajo Reservation. Deep, high-grade uranium mines are being located on the reservation and a nuclear power plant is being built west of Phoenix. Others are in the offing.

Energy production uses great quantities of water. A 2,000 megawatt plant, the size of those now being built or planned, requires 20,000 to 40,000 acre-feet of water per year for steam and for cooling. Coal and water are also the ingredients from which synthetic methane gas will be produced to supplement or replace the nation's diminishing resources of natural gas. Planned coal-gasification plants will each use nearly 10,000 acre-feet of water per year. As of now, the Navajos have rights to a significant quantity of water.

Navajo and other Indian water rights are generally based upon treaties with the United States and upon constitutional grants of authority to the federal government. The existing treaty between the Navajos and the U.S. Government was signed in 1868. In negotiations leading up to the treaty, the U.S. Indian agent described the promised reservation as having "good lands and abundant timber, water and other resources."

In the landmark cases of *Winters* v. *U.S.* and of *Arizona* v. *Colorado*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Indians were entitled to as much water from rivers running through or bordering their lands as they needed to develop their reservations. Without the water, the Court pointed out, the treaties and governmental acts reserving the land for Indian use would be meaningless. The government, as the trustee of Indian lands, was duty bound to preserve Indian rights to the needed water.

Regardless of their rights, however, the Indians could not use their water to develop their reservations because costly dams and irrigation systems were needed. And regardless of the law and of trustee obligations, time after time the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers built dams and irrigation systems upstream from Indian lands and diverted the water to non-Indian settlers. The Indians on the rivers were left high, dry and penniless.

Navajo lands lie between the Little Colorado and the San Juan and Colorado Rivers, and the greater part is within the San Juan River Basin. Jicarilla Apache, Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Indian lands also lie within the San Juan River Basin. The San Juan is one of the two large tributaries of the Colorado River, and the only significant water source in northwestern New Mexico.

In the San Juan River Basin, Navajo Indian water rights



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under the treaty of 1868 waited nearly a century for recognition. Finally, additional water solicited by financial and commercial interests in Albuquerque from the overtaxed Rio Grande River, pulled the Navajo treaty obligation off the shelf. The United States agreed to construct a dam and irrigation system to provide 508,000 acre-feet of San Juan water for Navajo "agricultural and related" development. In exchange, the Navajo Tribe agreed to relinquish its Winters Doctrine rights above the 508,000 acre-feet, so that water could be diverted from the San Juan to the Rio Grande River for Albuquerque and other users.

After the enabling legislation was passed in 1962, the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project languished for ten years for lack of adequate appropriations and water has yet to reach Navajo land. On the other hand, the San Juan diversion tunnel was built posthaste and now carries San Juan water to the Rio Grande. The streams from which that water is diverted flow through the Jicarilla Apache Reservation on their way to the San Juan, but the Jicarilla rights were effectively ignored. Now Jicarilla streams run so low in dry seasons that their fish are dying and their economic future is walled in for lack of water. It is the old story in Indian affairs. In order to advance the economic growth of a well-developed white community, the first stages of economic development were denied to an underdeveloped Indian community.

The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project still has a specified legal right to 508,000 acre-feet of water. Water will reach the first block of 10,000 acres of irrigation project land in 1976. In following years, additional water is scheduled for delivery to succeeding blocks of land until in 1987 or thereabouts 110,000 acres will be under cultivation. Before the project is completed, projected energy development near the irrigation project will require 70,000 to 100,000 acre-feet of water.

Hard facts are hard to come by in determining Indian rights to water. In spite of the confusion in some figures and the total lack of others, however, there is enough evidence to make clear the threat to the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project. The flow of water in Western rivers has been declining for some time, and the probable amount for use in New Mexico during future years has been estimated to be about 660,000 acre-feet. However, present commitments amount to 740,000 acre-feet and energy developments will require another 70,000 to 100,000. The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project is entitled to 508,000 acre-feet. The San Juan-Chama diversion takes 135,000 acre-feet, existing power plant and industrial operations at least 64,000, and another 34,000 goes to municipalities and non-Indian farms along the river. Long-established Indian farms farther down the river use most of the return flow of industrial-municipal waste and of river bottom irrigation water. The irrigation project's sprinkler irrigation system will return very little water to the river.

If these figures are accurate—and, if anything, they understate the water shortage—the San Juan River has been overallocated by 50,000 to 100,000 acre-feet a year, assuming that 508,000 acre-feet is reserved for the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project and that irrigation project water must come from New Mexico's allocation. If projected energy plants near the irrigation project are built the water deficit will rise to 150,000 acre-feet or more per year. It seems clear that if the plants are to use New Mexico water, either the San Juan-Chama diversion will have to be stopped or the Navajos will have to give up irrigation project water. No one except Indians has suggested that the San Juan-Chama diversion be stopped, and attempts to cut back the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project are moving implacably ahead.

The Bureau of Reclamation is leading the way, its device being to restrict the use of project water to raising crops—no processing, no municipal use, and no industrial use. Much of the project's economic benefit should come, however, from processing and from industrial and commercial operations. The bureau estimates that purely agricultural use would take only 330,000 acre-feet of the irrigation project's 508,000 acre-feet. Water for crops such as alfalfa would take more water than the bureau's estimate, which seems to be aimed at leaving a surplus of 178,000 acre-feet of water for allocation by the Bureau of Reclamation and the state of New Mexico. Whether the bureau prevails may have to be determined by the courts, which will judge whether the Navajos have a right to the full 508,000 acre-feet in accordance with treaty obligations and Congressional and other government commitments to the Navajos.

If the courts rule in favor of the Navajos then the Navajos will decide how much if any water should be diverted from other uses to energy production. As long as the Navajos can hang onto their water rights, they can bargain from a position of strength in negotiating for sale or use of their energy resources. Thus the first and second questions of Indian survival—water and a productive economic base—are tied together.

Three levels of resource sale or use may be considered in planning for optimum Navajo returns with which to establish a productive economic base. First, the price at which the resources are sold can be raised. At present, the rates are set by long-term contracts with the companies, signed before the energy crisis was generally known. Coal is now worth three to four times as much as when the contracts were signed, but the Navajos still receive 15¢ to 25¢ a ton on coal mined in the three mining operations which are now going on, whereas Montana receives a royalty of 40¢ or more for coal taken from state lands and the Crow Indians receive a sliding scale with a 40¢-a-ton minimum. The United Mine Workers of America levies an 80¢-a-ton royalty for its health program. The size of the UMW royalty as well as the state and Crow Indian royalties and the increased value of the coal all indicate a wide margin that should be narrowed in royalty negotiations.

The Navajo oil contracts may be an even more telling illustration. The Navajos receive 12.5 to 16.67 per cent royalty on the crude pumped from their land. That oil is now valued at about $7 a barrel. Arab countries receive 50 to 66.67 per cent of the companies' oil revenues and Arab oil is priced at $10 to $12 a barrel. The actual contract terms are not numerically proportionate and the costs of production are widely different, but it seems likely that payments to American Indians are substantially inferior to those made to foreign countries.

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The second way to raise the Indians' share of returns from their resources is by ownership of mining, of processing and of distribution. As the primary producing countries know, the price of a final product does not primarily reflect the value of the raw material that goes into it, but mainly the value added through manufacturing and distribution. Again, an imprecise but indicative illustration can be found in oil. The crude that leaves the Navajo Reservation at about $7 a barrel comes back in refined products, including quart cans of motor oil, for each of which the Navajo consumer pays 75¢ to 85¢, an average of $125 to $140 a barrel. Except for the outlet markup, the difference is mainly value added by factor payments—wages, profits, interest and rents. These payments go to the West Coast and Texas, where Navajo crude oil is refined and packaged for consumers.

A main block to ownership of processing is the huge capital cost—more than half a billion dollars for an electrical power plant like those around Navajo country, as much or more for coal-gasification plants, a quarter million for an oil refinery, etc. Another problem lies in control of markets by the huge companies. Nevertheless, small generating plants and oil refineries exist, some of them with less than one-tenth the capital costs quoted above. Indians might start by operating such small plants on their own, and work their way toward larger installations.

An alternative to development of small plants is a joint venture in large-scale plants with one or another of the big companies. The Navajos could establish their proportionate share of ownership by treating their mineral resources as capital. Two major companies have indicated willingness to negotiate joint ventures for certain uranium and gasification by-product operations.

The third way to improve Navajo returns on their resources is through a development plan that will integrate resource exploitation with industrial and commercial service, and with other development. The difficulties in integrated development are illustrated by what the Navajos face in planning a new town on the reservation to house the irrigation project and energy plant workers. Such a town would channel into Navajo development some of the money that will otherwise go to off-reservation businesses in border towns.

One of the major problems is to find the money needed for the public services which the new community will require—education, law and order, local government and the rest. The states and their subdivisions around Indian country support such governmental services by taxation. If the Navajos pay for these services out of their royalties on depleting resources, they will have to reduce investments in productive development and thus forfeit continuing employment when the resources run out.

A tribal revenue system is the obvious answer, but the states of Arizona, New Mexico and Utah have pre-empted practically all the ready sources of revenue. The great plants and mines on Indian land are already taxed by the states—except for the Indian land itself on which the industries are situated. And now the states have found a legal way to impose taxes on Indian land through a "leasehold value" tax. Such a tax has been upheld in the courts, and New Mexico and Arizona are moving rapidly to levy it on land in the Navajo Reservation. The tribe could levy its own tax on its own land, but legal doubts seem likely to hold back tribal action until the states pre-empt the field.

Thus all Indian development options are clouded. Indian water rights may be expropriated at any moment. Resource prices, processing and integrated development are held back by a web of contractual, market and financial constraints. Unless the Indians can cut through the web, they will dissipate their resources without gaining an alternate economic base for tribal society.

One way to escape the web is simply to break loose—to cancel the existing contracts. Some Indians have suggested that July 4, 1976 would be an appropriate date for cancellation and the Northern Cheyenne have taken action against a lease similar to Navajo leases on coal-bearing lands. Petroleum-producing countries have successfully abrogated agreements with some of the same multinational corporations whose subsidiaries have leases on Indian lands.

Given the power relationships in the United States, however, simple cancellation seems to be a counsel of desperation. An alternative would be for the Navajos and each other tribe to design a rounded plan for its own resources—setting its own timetable for resource use, its required share of ownership and its other requirements to meet Indian needs and views. If the tribes join together and enlist support of Indian friends, an Indian energy plan might have a fighting chance with Congress to replace the present exploitation of Indian resources by and for non-Indians.

The Navajos have ready the framework for such a plan. Two years ago Peter MacDonald, chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, presented to the council, and the council adopted, the Navajo Ten-Year Plan for Economic Development. This was a straightforward proposal for tribal and private investment in productive enterprise and for government investment in roads, schools, health and other social overhead. The amount of investment was calculated to attain practically full Navajo employment in useful, productive work. Optimum development of Navajo resources, both human and natural, was therefore the key to the plan's investment structure. The chairman's statement introducing the plan declared its purposes:

> What is rightfully ours, we must protect; what is rightfully due us, we must claim. What we depend on from others, we must replace with the labor of our own hands and the skills of our own people. What we do not have we must bring into being. We must create for ourselves.

The plan and its purposes were just the thing Washington had been calling for, but Chairman MacDonald's brave words went unheard. Two years ago, Washington was completely absorbed in other, stranger ventures. Now the country is teetering on the edge of a deep depression, and shows little sign of summoning the will to save itself by measures such as the ten-year plan and other means to aid the disadvantaged.

The energy crisis offers an opportunity, however, for the Navajos to bring the ten-year plan forward again, this time focused on energy resource development that will serve the tribe in future years when resources are depleted.

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This leads to the final question about Indian survival, and again the answers to the first two questions are basic to answering the third—the question about the ecosystem and Indian culture. A positive answer to the first two questions depends on two fundamental reallocations of resource use. Resource exploitation must be rescheduled from the present and immediate future to the long run and to future generations, and there must be a massive redistribution to Indians of the revenues from their resources.

These reallocations are profoundly needed, not only for Indians but for the whole world. Indians increasingly see signs—vapor trail webs spread by jets across the sky, mushrooms higher than mountains and other sights which, in the Hopi prophecies, immediately precede the destruction of the world. Scientists of many countries see a similar fate in evidence ranging from this year's expected starvation on an unprecedented scale to the deterioration of protective ozone layers as aerosol spray drifts into the upper atmosphere. In the Hopi message, the world may yet be saved if mankind turns to "the peaceful way of harmony with each other and with nature all around. . . ." Some scientific discourse has the same message.

"They had what the world has lost. They have it now," John Collier began his *Indians of the Americas.* What the Indians still have, and the world has lost, "is the ancient, lost reverence and passion for human personality, joined with the ancient lost reverence and passion for the earth and its web of life."

John Collier wrote his classic in 1948 and since then the margin of time has critically narrowed for both Indian and world survival. The Indians are on the edge and may inevitably be drawn into the resource exploitation machine —the mining, production and consumption machine of modern society that transforms and exhausts the earth's resources in response to its own unseeing drives and compulsions. The managers of the machine must plan and guide it to provide the maximum wealth and power for its corporate components. The owners who provide the needed investment put their money where the highest and most secure returns are offered. The workers have no role except to keep up production. Finally, the machine itself generates the consumption ethic—the pleasure in purchasing and the success motivation geared to material wealth —which in turn keeps it going.

The Navajo, Apache, Ute tribes and other Indians have thus far escaped the machine by their geographic and cultural isolation. Pueblos have escaped by encapsulating themselves in their communally centered, religious life. Now the energy crisis is making isolation more and more difficult for all Indians and next to impossible for some. Whether the Indians can hold their independence and maintain their meaning for the world may depend on whether they can meet this new challenge to their resources, finding an Indian way to put to work only the technology they want to use, and using it in their own good time for Indian welfare and Indian purposes. □

BEHIND THE CIA

EMERGENCE OF THE DUAL STATE

ALAN WOLFE

Revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency has been actively involved in spying on the anti-war movement have set off yet another round of breast-beating about this extraordinary agency of state. The pattern is established: every few years, someone discovers that the CIA is not doing what it is supposed to be doing; there is loud declamation; commissions are established; legislators say that now, this time, they will do their job and find out what is really going on; a few agency officials resign; public interest, first intense, begins to wane; things return to "normal," until the next wave of recriminations sweeps in. Meanwhile, the spying goes on and on.

Behind all this activity, and the reason why it takes the form it does, is a contradiction at the heart of American politics and government. Because the United States is a class society, in which some obtain most of the wealth and power and others live only to serve them, the state must be able to protect the interests of those wealthy and powerful people, both at home and abroad. At the same time, to win obedience from people who are not stupid and have real expectations about fairness and freedom, the state must give the appearance of being open and democratic. Solving this contradiction has never been easy. Of all the various attempts, the creation of the CIA and related bodies is the most interesting, for the law which established this agency created in the United States what can only be called a dual state. One part of the state was open, democratic, highly visible and generally impotent; the other was covert, lean and ready to operate wherever it had to. As a solution to the central problem of a society that is bound by class yet commited in theory to liberal democracy, the dual state was ingenious—one face for each pole of the contradiction. The only problem has been that it has never fully worked, and what we see in the current revelations about the CIA is an indication of why it is not working now.

The CIA, it should be emphasized, is only one small part of the covert face of the dual state. Intelligence-gathering units operate in the State, Treasury and Justice Departments (as well as in the Atomic Energy Commission) and in each of the armed services. Within the President's staff, the Assistant to the President for Na-

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tional Security Affairs (a post made powerful by McGeorge Bundy), the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the National Security Council are all part of the government that Americans know little about. Finally, within the Department of Defense lies the National Security Agency, with an annual budget of more than $1 billion, 20,000 civilian employees (50,000 to 100,000 military personnel as well) and freedom from public scrutiny (even the "public" Congressional hearings into this agency are held in secret and kept secret). NSA, according to Douglas Watson's recent four-part series in *The Washington Post*, was created not by Congress, but by a secret Presidential directive of 1952, one which has still, despite repeated inquiries, not been made public. No one knows the exact dimensions of what the Prussians used to call this *Staat-im-Staat*, but everyone now guesses that they are bigger than was once thought.

Once it was considered an act of courage and an affirmation of one's political commitment to oppose the actions of the government; now one makes a bold political gesture by trying to find out what those actions are. In a situation of secrecy, the quest for knowledge is a radical act, and so the recent publication of books by former members of the secret state like Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee is most welcome. But behind the mass of facts which have suddenly emerged lie deeper questions. How did this dual state come into being? Through what process was there created a side of government which is as private as the other is public, as closed as the other is open, as specialized as the other is general, one which breaks the laws that the other created, one which denies the public philosophy that the other espouses, one that belittles the values the other holds sacred? A glance into the construction of the dual state becomes a glance into our own future as citizens of a nation that is at once democratic and totalitarian.

The CIA, as all the newspapers have been quick to point out, has a "charter," the Act of 1947 which created it. What is not generally noted is that this Act may have been the single most comprehensive piece of legislation ever passed by the American Congress. The National Security Act of 1947 unified the military services after years of debate, institutionalized the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the National Security Council and transformed the Central Intelligence Group into an agency. The life of every American was fundamentally altered by the passage of this law, yet it has been the subject of few studies. (The two best, written from widely different political perspectives, are Demetrios Caraley's *The Politics of Military Unification*, and Robert Borosage's article, "The Making of the National Security State," in Rodberg and Shearer, *The Pentagon Watchers*).

To go back to the events which surrounded this Act is to discover the major dilemmas which the CIA has provided for American democracy and to pose questions about its future. The problem for the decision makers was as follows: if a perfectly workable covert state were created and backed by military might, both its cost and the fact that it violated some key democratic norms could make it unacceptable, once the postwar hysteria subsided, to the people at large. On the other hand, if costs were to be held within tolerable limits and democratic expectations were to be honored, the new state might not be able to satisfy all the imperial dreams of those in power. This problem dominated the thinking of the decision makers.

At the very end of World War II, on June 19, 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal asked a businessman named Ferdinand Eberstadt to answer three questions: is military unification a good thing? If not, what changes should be made? What should be the scope of the postwar national security organization? Although Eberstadt was a friend of Forrestal, and was expected to issue exactly the suggestions that the Secretary wanted, particularly a recommendation against military unification (which he did), there is nonetheless a hint of chastisement in Eberstadt's letter of transmittal:

> Sir: Military efficiency is not the only condition which should influence the form of our postwar military organization. To be acceptable, any such organization must fall within the framework of our traditions and customs. It must be of such size and nature as to command public support. It must be aimed at curbing the weaknesses disclosed in late wars. And finally, it must be conducive to fostering those policies and objectives which contribute to the service and protection of our national security.

The issue had been posed; more than any other participant, Eberstadt insisted that democratic expectations were an important factor to be considered, and that makes his report fascinating reading, even if its most important recommendation, against military unification, was not eventually accepted. The specific "traditions and customs" which became issues in the debate over the law were three: civilian control of the military, the preservation of a democratic façade and high efficiency leading to low taxes.

The concept of civilian control of the military should not be lightly dismissed as some rhetorical nonsense of the ruling class; it may be worthwhile, from the point of view of that class, to sacrifice a bit of military efficiency in return for more faithful adherence to ruling-class needs. Furthermore, civilian control over military affairs softens inter-service competition, which can reach severe proportions; having a businessman at the head of the Defense Department suggests to the Army that a Navy man is not, and vice versa. Consequently, there is every reason to believe statements like this one from the Hoover Commission Task Force on National Security Organization, again chaired by Eberstadt:

> The completely efficient security system will not be economical. The completely economical security system will not be militarily efficient. . . . Civilian control over military affairs involves some cumbersome and dilatory procedures and may even lead to serious technical mistakes; yet military power freed from civilian control would lead to even more serious mistakes—perhaps irreparable ones.

In furtherance of this principle a number of steps were taken. It was agreed by all that the head of the newly created CIA would be a civilian. When a proposal was worked out to unify the services, it was agreed that a civilian would be, in the words of Sen. Styles Bridges, the

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new super-deluxe Secretary. Further, Congress, more specifically the two Armed Services Committees, were promised participation in all the important decisions that had to be made. Finally, the National Security Council was placed under the direction of the President, whose role as Commander in Chief was emphasized, and this body, composed of both civilians and the military, was expected to be a policy-making, not just an advice-giving, organization.

Other steps contradicted the same principle. The head of the Defense Department's National Security Agency has always been a military man, though through some kind of bizarre pluralism, the next in command is always a civilian. Further, these designations are not always clear in practice; it was widely known that civilians like Walt Rostow embarrassed the military with their aggressiveness and desire for blood. The point is simply that serious attention had to be paid to reaffirming the notion of civilian control precisely because the principle was in the process of being undermined. Democratic fears about generals could not easily be set aside, even as those in power were trying their hardest to give the brass its head.

A similar problem arose with respect to secrecy. While everyone conceded that covert operations, and a covert apparatus to carry them out, would be part of the postwar structure, some also understood that this might pose for the state a problem of legitimation. Eberstadt's report, as usual, expressed the contradiction: "The [National Security] Council should render annual reports to the President and to Congress. To the extent that national security does not absolutely require secrecy, its reports should be published. Thus the public would be posted on these vital matters by an authoritative and dependable source. In this way, the council could aid in building up public support for clear-cut, consistent and effective foreign and military policies." Too much secrecy was seen as a problem, not because these men were committed in principle to open government, but because a gesture toward openness would elicit the needed public acceptance of the new reality.

But despite this concern, little attention was paid to the problem at that time. Harry Truman said that he never expected the CIA to become an independent, policy-making authority; in his words, it was supposed to be only a gatherer of information. In the Senate hearings on the 1947 law, the CIA came up only three times and only once for substantive discussion. Senator Tydings, a highly conservative Maryland Democrat, who would later fall prey to Joseph McCarthy, expressed fear that the vagueness of Section 202 of the bill, concerning the CIA, would permit no restraints on the agency once it came into existence. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, heading the Central Intelligence Group which, characteristically, was acting like an agency even before it was created by law, assured him that this was not so, because a forthcoming bill would specify those exact powers. Had the new bill been prepared? Tydings asked. Yes, was the reply, "but we do not want to submit it until we have reason for it." Evidently there never was a reason, for no serious attempt was made to specify the powers of the CIA until after it had made some of its most serious blunders. Floor debate also was minimal. To be sure, one member of the House said, Cassandra-like:

> We must avoid the risk of there ever developing in our government a military Gestapo. As we well know, one of the causes of the last costly war was the fact that the military took over the control of civilian governments. The ordinary citizen lived in constant fear of the military intelligence. He was afraid to express himself. He was afraid of even his own thoughts.

But there was no follow-up to the warning. Besides, for a law of this type, floor debate was for show; any significant legislative contribution would have to come from the two Armed Services Committees, and there the role of the CIA was scarcely discussed. The military chiefs wanted it, and the men on these committees had been selected because they knew how to listen to the military chiefs—quietly and respectfully.

But despite the lack of debate, statements that were made raised all kinds of implications about an organization of professional spies within the state. The whole issue was laid out with precision by Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman on April 2, 1947: "I consider," he said, "the Central Intelligence Agency to be a vital necessity under present world conditions. *Its necessity will increase with our greater international responsibilities* and as the power of sudden attack is amplified by further developments in long-range weapons and in weapons of mass destruction" (emphasis added here and elsewhere in direct quotation). In an unusual procedure, a private citizen, a lawyer from New York named Allen Dulles, was asked to give his opinion. Since he was leaving for Europe, Dulles filed a deposition with the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It said that "The Agency should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job." He emphasized that the head of the CIA should be a civilian. Like a member of the high judiciary, Dulles analogized, the head of the agency should have long tenure and should be free "from interference due to political changes"—by which he apparently meant elections. Pointing to the British system as ideal, he called for the CIA to possess "exclusive jurisdiction to carry out secret intelligence operations." In short, testimony in this vein indicated to those who wished to concern themselves that secret intelligence would pose a problem to the maintenance of open democratic structures; the fact that very few chose to recognize the contradiction did not mean that it was nonexistent. The structure in which men like Howard Hunt would exercise their "passion for anonymity" had been created.

Judging by the amount of discussion devoted to it, a third point was considered by the participants to be much more important than either civilian control or democratic structures; that was the question of money. If the existence of a national military establishment were to cost a great deal, there might be a taxpayer revolt; yet if the budgets were kept low, there would be serious damage to the imperial designs of those in power. The first Eberstadt report grasped that issue: "The American people," it said flatly, "will not support a military establishment which they regard as extravagant in its demands upon their services or their pocketbooks." From the Senate hearings

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on the National Security Act one sees that no other issue so dominated the minds of these conservative gentlemen, most of them from the Middle West. There seemed to be only one way to keep costs down, but it was highly contradictory. As the Hoover Commission report of 1949 explained, "basic criteria" suggested that "the elimination of wasteful duplication is essential to good government, but . . . the preservation, within sound limits, of a healthy competitive spirit and of service pride and tradition are basic to progress and morale." Which was it to be: competition, which would waste the taxpayers' money, or the elimination of distinctive services, which would cost less but would attack vested centers of power? The question thus posed becomes part of a whole new set of considerations which faced the planners of the dual state, the contradiction between common and parochial interest.

As the Eberstadt report emphasized time and again, the major weakness of U.S. military policy during World War II had been lack of coordination, both among the military agencies and between the government and private manufacturers. If that were true, one would expect the report to argue that the military services be unified, but it did exactly the opposite. In an extraordinary passage, one that also reveals the qualified admiration which even liberal members of the ruling class had for both fascism and Stalinism, Eberstadt noted:

> The processes of democratic government in this country have sometimes seemed cumbersome and slow, even under the urgent stress of war. *We have often longed for the one-man decision* and have been inclined to minimize the tremendous benefits that arise from the parallel, competitive, and sometimes conflicting efforts which our system permits. *At times we have looked with envy at those systems which we believed dispensed with those time-consuming processes.* It has been enlightening, however, to find on closer examination that they have suffered from similar disadvantages without enjoying the benefits of ours.

This was the manifest reason for opposing military unification, but it was at best a half-truth, since nobody was arguing for one-man rule. The real issue was an intense conflict between Army and Navy. At its root were social considerations much more important than the theories of public administration offered to support each position.

In 1906 Otto Hintze, the German historian and legal theorist, had written that "the Army is an organization which penetrates and shapes the structure of the state. The Navy is only a mailed fist which extends into the outside world. It cannot be employed against the " 'internal enemies.' " Hintze was trying to explain the existence of democratic institutions in England and the lack of them in Germany. His idea was that countries dominated by a Navy will be more likely to adhere to democratic structures, while those dominated by generals will be more repressive. This analysis helps to explain what took place in the United States. By tradition, the Navy Department has been the home of the most patrician segments of the American ruling class; for a time it had seemed that the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy was an inevitable step in the upbringing of any male Roosevelt child. Elihu Root, a key member of the group which revitalized the U.S. military at the turn of the century, had close Navy ties; Alfred Thayer Mahan, an important apologist for American imperialism, was closely associated with this department. As patricians, those loyal to the Navy had a long-range perspective which emphasized the importance of democratic structures in winning the war for public obedience, even if specific smaller battles might be lost. The Army, on the other hand, was rooted not in New England but in the South and West, more peripheral areas of U.S. society. Its perspective was narrower, geared to immediate needs. Thus when James Forrestal, a perfect representative of the patricians, asked Ferdinand Eberstadt, another, to argue the case against military unification, he was being loyal to a tradition which had historical cogency but which also ran against the temper of the times. The defeat of Forrestal on this issue indicates not only a change in the structure of the state but also in the balance of class forces.

Oliphant, The Denver Post

"I Have My Boys Looking into Your Case . . . You Have Nothing to Worry About!"

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The unification of the armed services revealed that a combination of New Deal Democrats, among them Truman, and conservative Republicans close to the Army hierarchy had joined forces to install a new military establishment—one more parochial, more isolationist (yet, paradoxically, less pacifistic) and more willing to suspend its attachment to democratic forms in the interests of a narrow definition of national security. Faced with the new reality, the patricians had a choice. They could preserve their old focus, becoming, like Chester Bowles, critics of the new arrangements. Or, much more common, they could "prove" that they were as anti-Communist as anyone else. Though Henry Stimson had declared that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail," the men he brought into the government, men like Robert Lovett, Harvey Bundy and John McCloy, and their children (literally in the case of Bundy and Forrestal), showed no hesitancy on that score. It was good for the new order that they had moved with the times, for their very aristocratic and proper mien provided the cover for their vicious and often murderous policies. As Richard Barnet expressed it, "they stood their personal moral codes on their heads when they assumed their public role." This decline in the integrity of the group which had traditionally given the American ruling class its conscience, its Wendell Phillipses and its John Reeds, was the single most important consequence of the struggle over military unification.

The Army position on unification could not have prevailed without Truman, whose role began to be more decisive. Although he at first failed to realize the importance of the National Security Act, when he did he came out in the strongest possible terms for unification. What irked him about the Eberstadt report was one phrase. Eberstadt had written that the National Security Council, during wartime, would turn itself into a "war Cabinet." Much like reform-minded political scientists of this period, who wished to replace the chaos of American political parties with a model borrowed from Britain, Eberstadt and those who agreed with him saw the British system of fighting wars as perfection on earth. But Truman was aghast at the idea: "In some ways," he stated in his memoirs, "a Cabinet government is more efficient, but under the British system there is group responsibility in the Cabinet. Under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the President." The doctrine of Executive supremacy was clearly in the making. Truman wanted, not a war Cabinet but a group of advisers who would work under him, and for this reason, the unification of the various services into one department in his formal Cabinet was preferred to three separate departments each pursuing its own vested interest. Any of Truman's qualms about the covert state were practical, not ideological; it was Truman who in 1952 created the fantastically secret National Security Agency. The final passage of the National Security Act gave the country a law much closer to Truman's ideas than to Forrestal's. It was unification. Trying to save face, Forrestal called it all sorts of things, like merger and incorporation but, when Senator Tydings sarcastically asked him if he was maintaining that a rose by any other name smelled different, the point was conceded.

Truman, however, did not win every point. As Forrestal said on March 18, 1947, "I should be less than candid if I did not admit that this bill is a compromise." Perhaps in return for being a good sport and testifying for the bill, Forrestal was named the new super-deluxe Secretary, head of a Defense Department which he did not want created. Truman, on the other hand, was given the power to ignore the National Security Council, if he so wished; it existed, but it was not a war Cabinet. Further, in 1949 a series of amendments to the law strengthened the office of Secretary of Defense, thereby contributing simultaneously to Truman's theory but to Forrestal's power. The structure of the state was determined in the way that the American political system determines anything else, by bargaining and compromise among powerful vested interests.

The various parties could compromise because it had become apparent to them that excessive parochial conflict would seriously undermine their common interest in holding power. In 1949, now in his capacity as chairman of the Hoover Commission Task Force on National Security Organization, Eberstadt indicated that he would accept the new solution. Noting that "one of our greatest needs is to elevate military thinking to a plane above individual service aims and ambitions," his new committee recommended strengthening the office of Secretary of Defense, since "a greater measure of centralized authority is required within the military establishment." If this represented a *volte-face* for the Navy, Army sympathizers also showed themselves willing to compromise. Truman, for one, tempered his opposition to the NSC in practice; before the Korean War he would not even meet with it, but during that "conflict," the NSC was allowed to function in a vaguely policy-making way. The biggest surprise, however, occurred under Eisenhower. Although most people thought that the new President would naturally adopt the Army view on national security matters, since he had faithfully adhered to that position during his testimony on the National Security Act, the new President listened carefully to advisers who spoke otherwise. A committee headed by Nelson Rockefeller, one which may have set the all-time record for the greatest percentage of ruling-class types ever to serve on one committee (Robert Lovett, Vannevar Bush, Milton Eisenhower, Robert Sarnoff, Arthur Flemming, Omar Bradley), joined the Eberstadt group in its recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore Eisenhower, unlike Truman, tried to meet with the NSC every week, even calling it into session from Colorado when he became ill. During the Kennedy years it was a popular activity for political scientists like Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger to denounce the Eisenhower staff system as insufficiently hard-headed but, like a rediscovered piece of art deco furniture, it had a certain utility in retrospect. Until the advent of Nixon, it was Democrats, not Republicans, who tried to centralize the national security apparatus into smaller and smaller units.

The compromise worked out over unification solved for a time the contradiction between common and vested interests within the government. But what about the different interests of the men in power and of everyone else in the country? If individual businessmen, for example, pursued their own self-interest, the process of obtaining

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material for the cold war might be hindered. If labor unions in defense industries went on strike the same thing could occur. If the general public continued in its privatistic ways and did not respond to patriotic appeals, the mobilization necessary for the new structure might not be forthcoming. To deal with these questions, planners turned to every solution in their repertory. Forrestal suggested a vast harmony of interests; the National Security Act, for him, "provided for the integration of foreign policy with national policy, of our civilian economy with military requirements. . . ." For a time he was correct, but long after his suicide the war in Vietnam proved to all that what was in the best interests of the military was not in the best interests of Wall Street, let alone everyone else. Another answer was given by Eberstadt: draft the leaders of the private sector directly into the state. His report called for a National Security Resources Board that would exist in peace as well as war. Advisory committees composed of both industry and labor were to be brought directly into the state to make important decisions, for "an important objective of military organization must be the maintenance of close relationships between the military services and the industrial establishments—including the workers—on whom they must rely for the production of most of their weapons." To some extent the creation of the Roy Ash-dominated Office of Management and Budget under Nixon was based on the Eberstadt plan.

There was one other way to win support for the dual state: instead of bringing the military to the people, the people could be brought to the military. The militarization of everyday life would give everyone an interest in supporting the new military establishment, and the problem would be solved. The great appeal of this approach can be seen in the Eberstadt Report:

> Today the American people seem to have accepted the necessity of implementing our ideals for world order with the use of force against aggressor states. In these terms *public support for international cooperation has a high relevance in any planning of military policy*. If this public acceptance is to be fostered and made effective, due consideration must be given in organizational planning to the probable effects of various structural forms upon public understanding and public interest.
>
> Interest of the American people in our Military Establishment is not best obtained simply through appeals to public opinion. It can be based on more substantial grounds if means are provided for *active participation in various phases of military affairs by groups particularly concerned with aspects of military policy*. Thus the degree of public support will be greatly affected by the extent to which the representatives of labor and industry are called upon to cooperate in mobilization and planning, and experts in many other civilian fields are provided with opportunities to contribute their knowledge as it is related to national security problems. *Educational institutions and scientific laboratories can serve as channels of communication between the military and the civilians*. An arrangement with the universities and with industrial and scientific laboratories by which skilled men move back and forth between Washington and their own principal employment is needed. Such arrangements will have the very desirable effect of *breaking down the isolation from the currents of civilian life* that has tended to make the military a group apart.

Aside from anticipating just about every aspect of postwar life in America, this proposed solution worked. For twenty years so many groups—businessmen, labor, scientists and intellectuals—achieved so much self-advantage from the militarization of everyday life that no significant opposition was voiced to the new diarchy.

It is because of all the conflicts which expressed themselves in the period between 1947 and 1949 that Americans in 1975 are confronting the issues that should have been discussed then. In the twenty-five-year history of the dual state, any devices employed to mollify the effects of these contradictions slowly wore away. The militarization of the society, expressed by the fact that even roads had to be built and graduate students supported under the rubric of national security, destroyed the balance between civilian control and military necessity which men like Eberstadt had tried to preserve. The development of the CIA as a domestic police force outside of the Constitution destroyed for many the notion that a genuine democracy existed in this country. The attempt to preserve some equilibrium between military efficiency and low taxes destroyed both principles—not only did the system become inefficient but taxes took off like a Nike missile. Finally, the harmony among vested interests, achieved for a time, broke apart. It was because different factions of the secret state did not like what other factions were doing that the full story finally came out. Americans owe what they know about the Kennedy-Johnson planning for the war in Vietnam, the Watergate episode and the CIA revelations to insiders who went outside. The dual state could be maintained only if all these pressures could be kept in balance; when they could not be, its future had to be questioned.

Some of those responsible for the dual state understand their present dilemma. For example, Tom Charles Huston, the man who proposed Nixon's vast internal security mechanism, urged that the National Security Agency engage in domestic programs. But when doing so, he noted: "Use of this technique is clearly illegal; it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed." Now it has been exposed. Alongside the revelations of CIA domestic spying, Watson's *Washington Post* series indicated that the NSA had monitored domestic phone calls. Within the past four months Americans have been told more about the covert part of the state than they had learned in the previous twenty-five years. It is Bella Abzug, not William Colby, who seems on the offensive now, and the profession of spying is probably in lower repute at this moment than ever before. Herbert Philbrick's patriotism has become Gordon Liddy's posturing. One can only hope that publicity—the worst medicine for the body of a secret government—will continue to be administered in ever increasing doses.

Will the CIA survive 1975? Of course it will. Already men like Nicholas Katzenbach, an important theorist of the dual state under Johnson, has praised the creation of the Rockefeller Commission because the men on it can be trusted to keep the debate totally private. When it is appropriate, Americans will learn what their rulers decide they can be told. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.), who

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failed to ask probing questions about the NSA, will be responsible for investigating the CIA; that is not very different from hiring the man who robbed your store to protect it. Others speak of reforms, so that the structure itself can be maintained. Senator Proxmire, for example, has said that "Immediate and severe action is necessary to preserve confidence in the intelligence establishment, and more importantly, to guarantee the rights of Americans under the Fourth Amendment."

Yet in another sense, the CIA may not survive 1975, at least in the form to which it is accustomed. Our secret state survived this long only because a juggling act was being performed while the audience was watching another spectacle, that of the cold war. With the cold war substantially ended, the juggling act was exposed to direct public view and could no longer be maintained. Signs of the new situation are everywhere. The patrician fascination with unlimited power may be over; McGeorge Bundy has shifted from taking life to giving charity, and that may be part of a trend. Moreover, détente undermines the base of the covert state; without anti-communism there is simply no need for spies, unless new enemies can be found. And it may take a while to find them. For the time being, the heyday of the National Security State appears to be over. But those who operate it have always shown themselves more ready to retreat than to surrender. □

'TWO UPS, TWO DOWNS'

ON KEEPING A REVOLUTION

THOMAS I. EMERSON

After the American Revolution, a well-known story recounts, Benjamin Franklin was asked what kind of government the founding fathers had created at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. He was said to have replied, "A Republic, if you can keep it." The answer reflects a classic dilemma in making a revolution.

The problem is that all revolutions seem quickly to lose their initial spirit and direction. Institutions have a way of remaining much the same despite apparent political change. A feudal class gives way to a bourgeois class, a bourgeois class gives way to a bureaucratic class, but in the end not much has really altered. The ordinary people, in whose name the revolution has been made, suffer the same neglect, disadvantage and oppression.

Recently my wife and I had the good fortune to make a trip to the People's Republic of China. We were there only two weeks and our opportunity to observe and understand was limited. Nevertheless, we came away with some distinct impressions. We found many of the things that other recent visitors have reported: that the society as a whole is dynamic and dedicated; that the people are active, cheerful and friendly; that much disease and all squalor have been eliminated; that the standard of living is low but adequate; that it is safe to walk the streets at night; that the face of the country is being changed by tree planting, drainage, terracing and the like; in short that the Chinese have really made a revolution on behalf of the "workers and peasants." The thing that interested me the most, however, was that the Chinese had also recognized the difficulty of keeping their revolution and are trying to do something about it.

Their deliberate focus on the problem is apparent in many ways. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1969, was directed in major part against a developing bureaucratic elite which was losing sight of the original objectives of the revolution and taking the country back along the "bourgeois" road of personal advantage and vested private interest. A remarkable document—the Sixteen-Point Program of the Cultural Revolution, 1966, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party—describes how the ideal party cadre ought to oppose this development:

> There is the situation in which the persons in charge of Party organizations stand in the van of the movement and dare to arouse the masses boldly. They put daring above everything else, they are dauntless Communist fighters and good pupils of Chairman Mao. They advocate the big-character posters and great debates. They encourage the masses to expose every kind of ghost and monster and also to criticize the shortcomings and errors in the work of the persons in charge. This correct kind of leadership is the result of putting proletarian politics in the forefront and Mao Tse-tung's thought in the lead.

While we were in China the new constitution was adopted by the Fourth National People's Congress and promulgated amid fireworks, processions, big-character posters and other forms of excitement. It too repeatedly emphasizes the theory and practice of "continued revolution." The official report accompanying the constitution quotes Chairman Mao:

> In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle; there is the struggle between the Socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct Socialist education. . . . Otherwise a Socialist country like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every day.

"This is the main experience we have gained," the official report goes on, "and also our guiding thought in revising the Constitution."

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Discussion in China with those interested in law, government and politics revealed the same awareness of the need to counteract, on a continuing basis, the stultification and oppression inevitably generated by the party and state apparatus. What then, are the Chinese doing about the problem? We made note of a number of things.

First, the official theory of the state structure, embodied in the constitution, is "democratic centralism"—a concept that involves participation in decision making and administration by the people most immediately affected. Obviously, in a "proletarian dictatorship" with a planned economy much of the policy making and administration has to be performed at a top level. Nevertheless, a great deal of stress seemed to be put on applying the theory of democratic centralism in practice. For example, a formula frequently heard was "two ups and two downs." This referred to a procedure by which a policy matter was discussed at the lower level, considered by the higher level, and then sent down to the lower level again to repeat the process. How well it worked we do not know, but it is an intriguing concept and was certainly taken seriously.

Likewise, there seemed to be a surprising amount of actual decentralization. Each institution—urban district, rural commune, school, factory, hospital, art institute or other—had its own "revolutionary committee," dedicated and active. And at many points those at the receiving end exercised substantial local autonomy. Thus health clinics and health centers were usually set up and operated by the local institution where the people worked or lived; the central hospital was used only for difficult cases. Likewise, nurseries and kindergartens were connected with a place of work, not run from a central organization. And in the communes (the basic political subdivision in rural areas) decisions about clearing or draining new land, tree planting, terracing, building small factories and similar developments seem to have been made and put into execution at the lowest level.

In addition to trying to make "democratic centralism" work, the Chinese are endeavoring to keep their revolution by making major changes in the educational system. These seem to have been sparked by the Cultural Revolution, which apparently had more impact in this sector than in almost any other area of Chinese life. In general, the process might be described as building a consciousness suitable for a proletarian Socialist society. Children are taught the social ethic of "serving the people." "Friendship first, competition second" is one motto that suggests the atmosphere. Children who are weak in their studies are helped by others, so that a child rarely fails to move ahead with his class unless he has been forced to stay out of school by ill health. Course materials are related to earthy things. (Some of the schools seem to have gone overboard on this. At one elementary school a course on the rudiments of the social and natural sciences was taught under the title of "Common Sense." But they will probably adjust.) Examinations tend to be group projects.

A key feature of the educational process is the emphasis on actual work programs. In most schools, children from the third grade on (age 9) are required to put in some time at manual labor. This may take the form of working a few hours a week on a miniature assembly line, putting together parts of an electric switch. For older children it may involve working in a small school factory, making valves. At later stages the middle-school child (high school) may go out and work in a real factory or on a commune for one or two months of the year. In such cases they are frequently accompanied by their teachers.

The children seem to have taken to the new education rather well. They are bright-eyed, lively, healthy, apparently well-adjusted, under control but unregimented. The education they receive is firmly rooted in the real world. It cannot but affect their outlook. What the ultimate impact will be, after they enter the world of adult institutions, remains to be seen.

The Chinese, however, are also seeking to change that world of adult institutions. One of their most interesting and potentially far-reaching devices is to require that institutional workers participate in physical labor. This is now officially established in the new constitution. Article 11, after urging that all state organizations and personnel must "combat bureaucracy, maintain close ties with the masses and wholeheartedly serve the people," goes on to decree: "Cadres at all levels must participate in collective productive labor." And Article 12 requires that all the work of the "superstructure," including "culture and education, literature and art, physical education, health work and scientific research," must "be combined with productive labor." In total, the obligation seems to apply to all workers in the party and state apparatus, and in other institutions such as universities, hospitals, research centers and apparently factories, who do not work with their hands. And the injunction applies no matter what the rank of the institutional worker.

The purpose is in part to bring home the fact that physical labor is not to be scorned. Mainly, however, it is intended to give institutional workers some taste of the life of the manual laborer for whom the revolution was made and who operates at the basic level from which all reality is ultimately derived. The object is to take the organization person out of impersonal, sterile abstraction into vibrant life.

In this respect the constitution simply formalized a practice that, as a result of the Cultural Revolution, had become widespread. According to what we could see in China today, the obligation to perform "collective productive labor" is taken seriously and practiced extensively. Thus all the university and school faculty and administrative people with whom we talked affirmed that they spent some time, ordinarily two months a year, at a commune or in a factory. Our interpreter had worked side by side with a person of cabinet officer rank. Doctors at the hospital and health centers we visited go into the countryside at regular intervals to bring medical services to the rural areas and to participate in physical labor. Whether the practice will continue at a vigorous level, or become formalized and evaded, is hard to predict. At present, much of this "collective productive labor" appears to be performed with enthusiasm and a sense of mission.

Of course there is a price—the skill of a brain surgeon cannot be fully utilized on a commune—but the

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Chinese we spoke to are convinced that the cost is justified. And, from all we heard, there can be little doubt that the practice is effective in turning minds around. It would appear that nothing dispels institutional atrophy more speedily than a little manual work in field or factory.

Another sector with which the Chinese are greatly concerned is the military. Typically, no institution of modern government is less likely than the armed forces to keep the revolution on its initial course. The military is usually the first to succumb to the bureaucratic disease, and its support then goes to the most reactionary of the vested interests in the social structure. Frequently it simply takes over power from the civilian sector.

The Chinese have attempted to make the People's Liberation Army into something other than the usual professional corps. They have done this by assigning to the armed forces the function, not only of maintaining the security of the state but of helping the people of the country in their day-to-day labors. As the new constitution puts it, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is at all times a fighting force, and simultaneously a working force and a production force" (Article 15). Thus the PLA does more than train to fight battles. It helps to build canals, drain marshlands, reforest land and carry out similar projects of "social construction." Soldiers also serve on the "revolutionary committees" which govern every institution, help out in emergencies, are used as extra labor to break critical bottlenecks and in general serve as reserve task forces to back up important projects or accomplish specific goals.

It is difficult to say to what extent the civilian Chinese leaders have tamed the armed forces. Certainly the PLA plays an important role in China today, and it was called in, during the final stages of the Cultural Revolution, to help restore stability. We saw no evidence that China is a garrison state. PLA uniforms were frequent in Peking and sometimes observable elsewhere. But the soldiers (with nothing about their uniforms to distinguish officers from rank and file) seemed to be just walking the streets or seeing the sights. From what we observed, at the present time the PLA is safely integrated with the civilian population. Rather than constitute any danger to continuance of the revolution, it assists in that process.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Chinese efforts to keep the revolution from stagnating is the use made of freedom of expression. The People's Republic of China is, as the constitution says, a "dictatorship of the proletariat." As such, it does not tolerate dissent that challenges the basic nature of the system. In the words of Article 14, "The state safeguards the Socialist system, suppresses all treasonable and counterrevolutionary activities and punishes all traitors and counterrevolutionaries." It is understood that the terms "treasonable" and "counterrevolutionary" are to be given a very broad meaning, applying to differences of policy as well as structure. Moreover, Article 12 stipulates that culture, education, literature, art and scientific research "must all serve proletarian politics, serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers."

Nevertheless, within these limits, the Chinese have undertaken to guarantee freedom of expression. The right to criticize was a natural outgrowth of the way Chairman Mao led the revolution. As he said in 1945:

> Anyone should be allowed to speak out, whoever he may be, so long as he is not a hostile element and does not make malicious attacks, and it does not matter if he says something wrong. Leaders at all levels have the duty to listen to others. Two principles must be observed: (1) Say all you know and say it without reserve; (2) Don't blame the speaker but take his words as a warning. Unless the principle of "Don't blame the speaker" is observed genuinely and not falsely, the result will not be "Say all you know and say it without reserve."

The right to speak, and the duty to listen, were incorporated in the 1954 constitution and reaffirmed in the new constitution. Article 27 confers the right to petition for a redress of grievances:

> Citizens have the right to lodge with organs of state at any level written or oral complaints of transgression of law or neglect of duty on the part of any person working in an organ of state. No one shall attempt to hinder or obstruct the making of such complaints or retaliate.

Article 28 spells out a broader set of rights:

> Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration and freedom to strike, and enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism.

And Article 13 provides for the application of these rights in the conduct of public affairs, portraying the ideal balance sought to be achieved:

> Speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters are now forms of carrying on Socialist revolution created by the masses of the people. The state shall insure to the masses the right to use these forms to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, and so help consolidate the leadership of the Communist Party of China over the state and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.

So far as we could tell, these rights of free expression were meant to be observed and are in fact exercised. The Cultural Revolution was an explosion of airing views, great debates and big-character posters. Such activity seems to be still going on, in a more subdued way. In Nanking we saw big-character posters that were described to us as containing criticism of named persons in the local party or state hierarchy. And the process of prolonged discussion, at which various ideas are thrashed out, was clearly an integral part of institutional operations.

Whether this use of a bourgeois invention, employed to assure that "bourgeois" practices will never be revived, is going to persist and be successful is an open proposition. Certainly the overall limits put on free expression will make it difficult for the permissible areas to remain vigorous. But the Chinese we spoke to were convinced of both the importance and the permanence of the practice.

It is interesting, also, that Article 28 of the new constitution for the first time guarantees the "freedom to strike." The report to the Congress stated that this provision had

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been proposed by Chairman Mao himself. Previously, the right to strike had apparently not been recognized and it is difficult to foresee how it will work. Presumably the right will rarely be exercised, but the constitutional guarantee does indicate that, for limited purposes and where strong support from the rank and file exists, the strike might be another weapon for checking any trend in the management toward dissociation from the workers.

These are some of the ways in which the Chinese are deliberately and energetically attempting to change both institutions and consciousness. Can they do it? Will they succeed in keeping their revolution on the original track? On the basis of past experience the odds would seem to be against them. Only time will tell. □

THE FUTURE IS FUSION

KARL KEYERLEBER

Livermore, Calif.

In this pleasant valley southeast of San Francisco scientists split the atom to build ever more deadly weapons of war. Elsewhere on the 640-acre spread of the Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory other teams of scientists are crashing atoms together to build a new world. They are closing in on the riddle of nuclear fusion.

Fusion, the force that powers the sun and the stars—and the hydrogen bomb—has thus far eluded man's attempts to domesticate it for day-to-day use. Once tamed, it holds the promise of limitless energy for all nations at relatively low cost. It has been estimated that the energy in 1 gallon of water, if unlocked by fusion, would equal that in 300 gallons of gasoline.

Fusion and fission are physical opposites. Instead of splitting heavy atoms apart as fission does in today's nuclear reactors, fusion forces light atoms together to make fewer heavy ones. Both kinds of reaction release tremendous quantities of energy, but fusion does it without the accompanying high levels of radioactivity that many believe makes fission power plants a gamble with human lives. A fusion plant could be located in the heart of a city, something never proposed by the most ardent champions of fission plants.

So what else is new? the skeptic may ask. The search for a means to control fusion has been going on for a quarter-century. As recently as two or three years ago I found among those working on the problem a nagging suspicion that a sustained reaction—as contrasted with the one-shot burst in an H-bomb—was a distant hope that might never be realized. But rapid progress since then, aided by an unusual degree of international cooperation, has changed the outlook. Today they talk of *when* rather than *if*. At the Lawrence lab the target now is a demonstration fusion reactor by the mid-1980s. That is what is new—a time schedule at least several decades shorter than seemed possible just a few years ago.

Dr. Richard F. Post, deputy associate director for physics in controlled fusion at Livermore, has no doubt that power plants using fusion will be practicable. "We crossed that bridge some time ago," he said, referring to earlier doubts that it would ever be possible. "It is true that fusion power represents one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, technical challenges of this century. It is also true that this challenge is being met today. Major progress is being made—progress such that I, along with other fusion researchers, believe that in less than a decade sufficient scientific knowledge will have been established to insure the practical achievement of fusion power."

It is now time, Post said, to take a look ahead at national energy alternatives. He makes no attack on fission—he is, after all, employed by a government that underwrote the splitting of the atom and twisted the arms of utility leaders to launch the nuclear power program. But he warns against freezing into a frame of mind that looks on fission as the only solution.

The principal problem in fusing atoms is that all of them carry a positive electrical charge and therefore repel one another. To make them fuse, tremendous heat—100 million° centigrade or higher—and pressure are necessary; and they must be maintained not just for the infinitesimal time required to explode a bomb but long enough to kindle a chain reaction. To put the fuel, with its superheated ions and electrons racing wildly about, under sufficient pressure, it must be confined. Yet if it touches the walls of a confining chamber it will be chilled and dissipate its energy uselessly in melting the walls. Even to the layman, the difficulties are fairly obvious. At Livermore, as at other fusion research centers in this country and abroad, they are working on two approaches. One uses a magnetic field as a sort of bottle to turn the charged particles of fuel in plasma form back on each other, to collide and fuse. The other is to focus powerful laser beams on pellets of fuel, compressing them and forcing the fusion of their atoms. Right now the laser method is less well advanced than the so-called "magnetic bottle" technique; at Livermore they are still experimenting to hit on suitable lasers. But, later on, success with this method may offer a bonus: by plucking electrons from the supercharged particles it may be possible to generate electricity directly, skipping the cumbersome steps of using a boiler to produce steam, which in turn drives turbines to generate the current.

Success of fusion power, Post said, will solve the energy problems of the world for as far as we can imagine into the future. He cited the availability to all nations of abundant fuels, their low cost and the projected negligible effect of fusion reaction on the environment. "Not only

Karl Keyerleber, a Cleveland newspaperman and former college instructor, has long been interested in environmental problems.

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are fusion fuels virtually inexhaustible, but the spectrum of future possibilities and options is itself very broad. Whereas the fission process inevitably leads to radioactive products of high biological hazard potential and long life, the ashes of fusion are inert. For all these reasons many of us believe that fusion should be considered as the ultimate source of energy and that other sources, including conventional nuclear power, should be considered as interim sources."

Post attached one qualifier, and it applies also to the speed with which development will occur once the demonstration reactor has been built. That is the question of national commitment: the need for a level of support commensurate with the importance of the search. Fusion has received little funding for many years, while billions of dollars have been poured into fission.

Filling the gap in an important way have been extensive research programs in other countries, particularly the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The Russians have strongly backed fusion work and have freely shared the resulting knowledge. Soviet teams of scientists have several times visited the Lawrence lab and groups from here have made trips to Russian installations.

What are our nuclear priorities for the future? If fission reactors and development of the fascinating but dangerous breeder power plants, which can produce more fuel than they consume, retain top priority, then it is unlikely that fusion will be given a high level of federal support and funding.

A look at the state of fission power today raises grave doubts as to the wisdom of continuing to regard it as our main energy source in the future. Almost every week plans for new reactors are scrapped or deferred because of high cost, design problems or citizen opposition. Breakdowns or safety considerations have kept nearly all of the fifty-odd plants already built operating at considerably less than capacity. Just recently twenty-three were ordered shut down completely until cooling pipes were checked after cracks had been discovered in this vital safety equipment on three reactors. Fears expressed by scientists and others that accidents may release lethal clouds of radiation, that melt-downs might contaminate large areas, that the care of radioactive residues will prove too great a burden on future societies, or that we may become hostages to terrorists or dictators who have hijacked shipments of plutonium, already make up a massive body of literature. The late Atomic Energy Commission itself reported last year on 861 "abnormal events" at the operating power plants, many of them related to safety.

Fusion, fueled chiefly by deuterium taken from water by an inexpensive process, is not entirely free of radioactivity. One of its products, tritium, has a radioactive half-life of 12.5 years. But that seems a far more manageable problem than the plutonium and other products of fission which we are told will be dangerous for thousands of years.

A fusion reactor will cost about as much as a large fission reactor. Operating overhead should be much lower, a major saving being on the cost of fuel and its handling, since it will not be radioactive. And, as Post noted, there will be no deadly residual garbage to isolate from the environment.



Sketch of Livermore Experimental Laser Fusion Plant, Scheduled To Be Operating by Mid-1976.

Federal funding of fusion research came to about $120 million last year. Post expressed confidence that with the projected continued growth in support the goals he described can be reached. That may be. But one cannot help speculating on what might be achieved if the half billion or so dollars going to fission each year were shifted to fusion. As the development of the first atomic bomb and our later space program demonstrated, major technological objectives—once the basic scientific information is in hand—can be accomplished on a greatly shortened time scale, if they are given clear goals and adequate national commitment.

If fusion delivers on its glowing promise, not only will the independence President Gerald Ford talks about be gained but many other countries around the globe will be freed from their reliance for energy on a few nations that happen to occupy geologically advantageous turf. We went from little more than an idea to creation of the first A-bomb in five and a half years. We reached the moon in ten years. Can we afford to give less dedication to energy, which looms as the world's most serious political, economic and resource problem? □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

The Impersonality of Art

ST. LAWRENCE BLUES. *By Marie-Claire Blais. Translated from the French by Ralph Manheim. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 229 pp. $7.95.*

JAMES ATLAS

When Americans think of Canadian writers at all, it is usually critics like George Woodcock or Northrop Frye who come to mind. Recently the work of Margaret Atwood has received considerable attention, and there are a number of other poets whose origins, if not their allegiances, are Canadian. Canadian literature, though, like Canada itself, has rarely been regarded as independent, in the sense of possessing a cultural tradition entirely its own. In a time when the pressures of American imperialism are felt in the most remote corners of the world, how can those nations whose borders touch our own hope to extricate themselves from such a dominant influence?

That dominance has only just begun to be challenged. Until a few years ago, virtually all the Canadian publishing houses were subsidiaries of American or British companies, nor was there even a Canadian "literature" to speak of (if literature implies a written tradition recognized as both national and expressive of shared cultural values) until about the 1940s. The Canadian 19th century, unlike our own, produced no characteristic works that could be passed on, repudiated, or embellished, in the usual manner of literary influence. But one has only to read Edmund Wilson's *O Canada* to see how much has happened there of late. Wilson had a remarkable ability to discover what was of significance before any of his countrymen. His "Notes on Canadian Culture," published in 1965, was a reliable sign that work of some importance was being produced in Canada.

Nor was this the only indication. An entire issue of *The Times Literary Supplement* was devoted to "Canadian Writing Today" (October 26, 1973), in which what one of the more enthusiastic contributors called "Canada's Elizabethan Age" was submitted to an otherwise more cautious scrutiny. And George Woodcock, claiming less than the *TLS* author, noted "the striking parallels between what is happening here now, and what happened in the United States at the time of the recognition—definitely in the 1920s and tentatively long before—of a distinctive American literature" (*The Nation*, May 14, 1973). Whatever their historical accuracy, both of these comparisons indicate that the rather colonial notion of Canadian literature as a division of our own is no longer tenable.

I haven't the competence to discuss these generalities in any detail, and I mention them only to locate the work of Marie-Claire Blais within a useful context. Now 35, she has published ten novels, six of which have been translated into English; the appearance of such an extraordinary writer would seem unlikely without some explanation of her milieu. While the novels themselves owe much to highly developed artistic traditions, their themes and circumstances place them within the political and social life of contemporary Canada. This is more true of the later novels, the last of which is no less explicit in its politics than Sartre's trilogy or Malraux's *Man's Fate*. But even her earlier novels depict an essentially Canadian landscape, however concealed by a technique that blurs locale deliberately, rendering in a rather opaque fashion what later emerges with considerable clarity: the political oppression to which French Canadians have long been subjected.

This is by no means the crucial motif in her many novels; it would be schematic to look for such commentaries in *Tête Blanche* and *La Belle Bête*, the strange, oneiric novels composed before she was 20. In any case, her talent was evident even then—enough to support Wilson's claim, based on a reading of the first four novels, that she was "possibly a genius." Writing of Mlle Blais when she was 24, he detected in her work "the desperate cry that arises from the poverty, intellectual and material, the passionate self-punishing piety and the fierce defeated pride of Quebec." Whether or not this pride has been defeated remains to be seen, but the French Canadians have long been dominated by the English-speaking majority, and this domination has taken the usual form of rendering them a relatively powerless and oppressed class. Mlle Blais, educated in a convent in Quebec, has evidently experienced this oppression in both her Catholic schooling and in the poverty of her surroundings, an observation drawn from a literal reading of *The Manuscripts of Pauline Archange*, which her publishers have tentatively called autobiographical.

In one of the earlier novels, *David Sterne* (1967), the protagonist's experience in Catholic schools leads to revolt against a social order allied with the Church and so deserving of the same contempt directed toward the latter's pieties. The Jansenist rigors of a religion designed to "punish, chastise and humiliate" its adherents comes to be identified by Sterne, a young seminarian, as no more than a concealed instrument of the state, and his rejection of its teachings takes the form of nihilism, a view shared by a number of Mlle Blais's characters, many of whom are youthful and in despair, modern versions of the ill-tempered radicals to be found in *The Possessed*. *L'Insoumise* (1966), the story of a student who dies an accidental death while mountain climbing and his parents' obsessive attempts to discover the nature of his sexual relationships, which involve an older married woman and a veiled homosexual liaison, resembles *David Sterne* in its motif of the death wish. I would consider these two novels, along with two novellas of an earlier period, *Three Travellers* and *The Day is Dark*, to belong among Blais's minor works. But they are important in what they reveal about her accomplished later books. In none of these novels is the connection between the Catholicism she experienced and the shattered world of her characters made really clear; not until the sequence of autobiographical works does she achieve an orchestrated vision of the causes of a suffering that reminds one, in its bleakness and hidden terror, of Bernanos.

What seems most impressive about *The Manuscripts of Pauline Archange* is the evocative, crowded world through which her characters move. Pauline Archange lives in a lower-class neighborhood where people have become "insects drawn by the guttering light of their own disgust, drinking, eating, uttering strange-sounding words, and endlessly reproducing themselves and their own miseries."

The novel's density of detail, of spe-

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cific event, is not achieved at the expense of style. The Poire family appears "seated around the table making short work of platefuls of pancakes as thin and yellow as their own faces, soaked in a thin brown syrup that ran down from the corners of their mouths." Or, in a less oppressive image, she recalls how

> During Vespers on Sundays, the big girls went up into the loft and danced, all dressed up, beneath a cloud of feathers which they stuck all around their faces and tucked in their necks, thereby revealing, far from our imposed, imprisoned life, that they were already in possession of those imaginary men for whom they danced, even though they had not yet had either the time or the freedom to conquer them.

The characters themselves have a vividness absent in the earlier novels: her overworked and irascible father; her near-invalid mother; Germaine Léonard, an idealistic, radical doctor; Benjamin Robert, a promiscuous and tortured priest who seduces Pauline; her school friend Séraphine, run over by a bus—these are the desperate figures of Pauline's world, whose lives, unlike her own, promise nothing but sorrow or oblivion. Everywhere the wound of hurt and obligation imposes itself on her life. It is that wound that causes her to write, for without it "I was in danger of never having existed for anyone." Not for herself alone, but in order to restore the dignity these people have lost, the secret suspicion that their lives are governed by forces undisclosed to them.

In a sense, *The Manuscripts of Pauline Archange* represents the apotheosis of all Mlle Blais's work; the strict, vindictive nuns we have encountered before appear in these pages with a dimension they had previously lacked, just as the adolescent in revolt, now given the capacity to articulate the conditions of her sorrow, endows those who surround her with a proper humanity. Her salvation, contrary to the casuistic explanations of the Church, lies in the loss of innocence. But a sad unworldliness clings even to the poets in the *cénacle* she visits. Reciting their florid lyrics, discussing Chateaubriand, they are the cultivated echo of the more strenuous pieties she listens to in school. The novel concludes with a vow that the wound sustained in childhood, "this blood, spilled in unjust violence, would one day be the sap that fed my books, since no one can erase in us the marks of what we once have lived." Here the relation adumbrated in her earlier novels is provided its most explicit illustration; the artist's work is capable of overcoming trauma by means of those very episodes in the child's life which produced it.

In her most recent novel, Mlle Blais has turned away from the repetitive theme of her own struggle against the oppressive character of her origins to confront the larger conflicts in contemporary Canadian life. Directly political, even tendentious, *St. Lawrence Blues* evokes the depressed underworld of Montreal, the sordid lives of people in rooming houses. But she does not confine herself to the lower classes. Among the central figures are a novelist, talkative and full of battered pride, an espouser of liberal causes; his publisher, Corneille; and a doctrinaire Stalinist named Papineau (an ironic reference to Louis-Joseph Papineau, who led the first serious rebellion of the French Canadians in 1837). The chronicle of their chaotic lives during a Montreal winter takes place amidst a blizzard, personal tragedies, and a strike by Canadian workers that ends in violence. Mlle Blais has created a canvas impressive in its historical dimension and worth comparison with Zola's depiction of the Second Empire or Flaubert's of 1848 in *Sentimental Education*. Her portrayal of these events, conveyed in the words of a drifter named Ti-Pit, is characterized by a remarkable linguistic energy reminiscent of Céline; her protagonist sustains a difficult and complex narrative through well over 200 pages composed in dialect. Like Pauline Archange, Ti-Pit recognizes the power of language and takes pride in his mastery of it. And the language he speaks has a special political significance; his use of it is a means of exercising power over his own circumstances.

The novel's French title, *Un Joualonais, Sa Joualonie*, refers to the language spoken in the working-class ghettos of Quebec—the word *joual* is a corruption of *cheval*. Margaret Atwood, writing in the *TLS*, noted the "linguistic alienation" implicit in *joual*, "a language worn down by the frustrations of an intolerable existence." There has been some controversy in Canada of late over

THE ANSWER

Yes. Autumn. The leaves yellow and red.
When I got up this morning
no clouds, no thoughts, only the blue sky.
I slept downstairs, redreaming
the dream
where I'm talking with my father
who says he'll meet me for lunch,
his face so undeniably his that when I wake
I'm sure he will. That's why
I drove out here again. Not that he's here.
I just wanted to be by myself
with the drifting water and bright sky,
so I drove fast to the spot I love between
the first stone balcony with its war heroes
and the bronze rower shipping his oars
and slid out and ran under the yellow and red trees,
looking up at them as I passed and they passed.
And forgot him.
Because I can now, because
his sad, square, bitterly joking face
rises by itself through me—
the way a cloud floats in suddenly, shifts, breaks up and disappears—
and will until I go
back to the placelessness before us, after us.
It isn't even love that does this, or needing somebody, it isn't
even the sick miracle of being human or the leaves
blown down crackling underfoot.
I can't explain. And I'm happy not trying to.
Today your silence was what I hear every time
I go out at night
and stand still and don't look—
a chanting of stars and ants, the dry
grass and leaves congregating by accident, the buzz
of the empty world, answering.

Stephen Berg

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the uses and significance of *joual*. The poet Gaston Miron called it a non-language, while some others have discerned in its vigor and flexibility a renewal of language comparable to the Provençal that emerged from Latin or the French of Rabelais. In the mid-1960s, a number of writers associated with the left-wing review *Parti-Pris* decided to write in *joual* in order to establish the claims of a language essentially *québécoise*. That dispute informs *St. Lawrence Blues*, in which much of the dialogue is in *joual*; that tongue, so vivid in its idioms, is what imbues the characters with such resonant, expansive vitality. Few novelists since Zola have succeeded in portraying as rich a spectrum of types (I don't use the word in connection with its Social Realist meanings), whose common humanity depends upon their speech; even the minor figures who populate this novel, the lost denizens of Ti-Pit's boardinghouse, women in bars, a laconic ambulance driver, the family come down from the provinces to participate in the strike, reveal themselves in their idioms. The panorama of urban life unfolds in Mlle Blais's portrayal no less comprehensively than in the great novels of 19th-century France. At once intensely comic and full of controlled despair, *St. Lawrence Blues* depicts a prerevolutionary milieu in which the dignity of personality survives despite conditions of political and social hopelessness. In this, it belongs among the works of what Lukács called "critical realism," which illuminate the possibility of social change, drawing on the conspicuous pressures of history to motivate and inform their characters. □

Marxism and Confucianism

TRADITION AND REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM. *By Nguyen Khac Vien. Indochina Resource Center: P.O. Box 4000D, Berkeley, Calif. 94704. 169 pp. Paper $2.65.*

HELEN B. LAMB

Why is it so hard for Americans to come to grips with the reality of Vietnam? Even those of us who have felt most deeply that our actions in Indochina have been utterly pernicious and immoral find it difficult to understand whence comes the extraordinary heroism, perseverance, and even serenity of those Vietnamese who have stood up successfully to French, Japanese, and finally United States intervention in their country.

A new book, *Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam*, by Nguyen Khac Vien, throws light on this enigma. It is a collection of essays written over the past fifteen years by a Vietnamese Marxist who, as the son of a Confucian scholar, was deeply imbued with Vietnam's cultural heritage. Thus he embodies in his own being the two wellsprings of strength which have created the extraordinary phenomenon of modern Vietnam. In his writings the Vietnamese come to life as real people, inspired by a combination of their millennia-old traditions and the Marxist revolutionary ethos of the 20th century.

There is great variety in this small volume. Some of the essays are in a deeply personal vein, as when the author writes in "The Banyan Tree" of his touching childhood dreams for his village, dreams which the revolution has fulfilled. In several essays he deals with practical, concrete questions concerning economic and social development in countries recently emerging from feudalism, and what can be learned from the Vietnamese experience.

In another study, "Confucianism and Marxism in Vietnam," first published in *La Pensée* in 1962, he develops the intriguing theme that Confucianism and Marxism are not the unlikely bedfellows which they might seem to be, and indeed are considered to be in contemporary China. While keenly aware of the stultifying impact of Confucianism on the relations between classes and between the sexes and on the quest for scientific knowledge and institutional innovation, he nevertheless singles out certain aspects of Confucianism that gave strength and purpose to the Vietnamese people in their hour of need and were, curiously enough, compatible with Marxism.

These aspects are spelled out after a fascinating detour into the distant past in which he relates the struggle for ascendancy between Confucianism and Buddhism and assesses the significance for Vietnam of the triumph of Confucianism. Since the West's individualism is alien to both Buddhist and Confucian thinking, it is important to grasp the distinction between these two contending doctrines: in Buddhism, the individual renounces the world and himself; in Confucianism, he subordinates himself to the group—its needs and fulfillment, not in a shadowy afterlife but in this life, the group being the family, the local community and the Emperor as symbol of the nation. Confucius himself wrote:

> The way is not beyond man; he who creates a way outside of man cannot make it a true way. A good man is content with changing man, and that is enough for him. . . . I am not someone who has received special enlightenment; I am merely a man who has studied a great deal and ceaselessly tried to teach others.

Nguyen Khac Vien also quotes from a Confucian scholar of the 12th century, writing at the peak of Buddhist influence:

> Why have the fear of Buddha's maledictions and the need to implore his mercy become so deeply embedded in people's minds? Royal princes and common folk worship Buddha and squander their wealth on the pagodas. They are as happy as if they had received a written guarantee for the next world.

As until recently in Tibet, so in the Vietnam of that epoch, Buddhist asceticism for the individual was matched by excessive and luxurious spending on Buddhist pagodas with their armies of servants, and on Buddhist monasteries which then controlled large tracts of land cultivated by serfs. When Confucianism triumphed over Buddhism in the 15th century, the big estates were broken up and laws passed to curtail the building of pagodas and the power of the bonzes. It is this essential secularism and humanism in Confucianism that links it to Marxism.

There are also other affinities. Confucianism stresses a person's duties to others, the family, community and state, rather than one's individual rights, and regards education not so much as a means of imparting knowledge as of inculcating an ethic. The higher one was in the social hierarchy, the greater was one's responsibility to set an example of right conduct to others. Apparently, Vietnamese Marxists continue to recite certain Confucian sayings, such as "Do not be corrupted by wealth," "Do not succumb in the face of adversity" and "Do not bow your head before demonstrations of force." And Ho Chi Minh describes the role of Marxist leaders as follows:

> They must always put the well-being of the population above all. They must opt for the collective interests first and always be ready to be the first to suffer and the last to find happiness. These are the ethics of communism.

There is in addition a special reason

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why Vietnamese Marxists regard their Confucian heritage somewhat differently from the way the Chinese Marxists do. In Vietnam, Confucian scholars led a long, bitter and heroic struggle against the French invasion in the 19th century. It was a struggle which ended for the time being in failure, but which produced many heroes who have supplied 20th-century Vietnam with shining examples of right conduct, that is, selfless devotion to the welfare of the nation.

In its grasp of history and insight into the way that Vietnamese people feel, this essay of Nguyen Khac Vien's is truly outstanding. It should do much to build a better comprehension of Vietnam in the English-speaking world. □

Psychoanalyst, Heal Thyself!

THE SACRED AND PROFANE LOVE MACHINE. *By Iris Murdoch. The Viking Press. 374 pp. $8.95.*

EDWIN J. KENNEY, Jr.

For Iris Murdoch life is absurd and mostly comic. In her fiction the multiplicity and discordance of human experience are never elevated to the intense and heroic proportions of tragedy. Instead they are the basis for her fine achievements of comedy and fantasy—of sophisticated wordplay, bedroom farce and extended projections of bizarre images. In Miss Murdoch's latest novel, *The Sacred and Profane Love Machine,* comedy seems to have failed her, and what we have is just absurd misery. The uniqueness and mysteriousness of human personality and the play of forces in human life are reduced to dull mechanical alternation. The machine as an image of human experience replaces the more fanciful images that provide the titles and episodes for Miss Murdoch's earlier novels, such as *Under the Net, The Flight from the Enchanter, The Sandcastle, The Bell, A Severed Head, The Unicorn.* The tedious, labored banality of *The Sacred and Profane Love Machine* suggests that Iris Murdoch may have reached a stage of crisis in her development of ideological patterns for human life, may herself feel the enterprise rather a bore.

In her quest for patterns in human life, Iris Murdoch's imagination is repeatedly drawn to the psychosexual rhythms of fascinating and repellent Oedipal love and its taboo equivalents. One of her problems has been the imposition of her knowledge of psychoanalytic formulas upon the consciousness and vocabulary of her fictional characters. In *The Sacred and Profane Love Machine* she seeks to solve this problem by rendering these Oedipal themes dramatically in dreams and by making the central character a lay analyst (a Murdochian pun) so that the language of psychoanalysis will not seem so factitiously intrusive. All of the characters in this novel are haunted by dreams filled with Freudian images and situations; the detailed presentation of these dreams signals breaks in the narrative and shifts in point of view, and thus emphasizes the Oedipal origins of the characters' obsessive passions and limits their midsummer night dream encounters to the simplest mechanics of psychoanalytic theory.

Miss Murdoch's treatment of the analyst, Blaise Gavender, reveals an uneasy ambivalence about such a reductive view of life. Blaise is confused and anguished by his conflicting love for his "sacred" wife, Harriet, and his "profane" mistress, Emily, his "Queen of the Night." He is alternately exasperated and euphoric at his divided life and what he glibly calls his "split personality." He is another of Miss Murdoch's "accidental men" whose lives seem to be made up of disparate willed acts that appear a good idea at the time, but that now have assumed the unexpected rigidity of enforced pattern. He is finally forced by the meddling of Emily's ambiguous confidante, Constance Pinn, and of his neighbor, Montague Small, a famous and cynical writer of slick and violent detective thrillers, and by the spooky appearance of his illegitimate, clairvoyant son by Emily, Luca, to seek a union of the hitherto separate, antithetical parts of his world. This union seems to threaten his existence rather than complete it: "How *could* those two worlds meet? Their utter separateness was the guarantee itself of an intelligibility and order. Their separateness was the prerequisite of any thought, the pre-supposition of the world, it was what thought was about, what the world was about."

This basic dualism powers the complex machinery of Blaise's relations with the women in his life. They are caught in turn between their love for Blaise and their desire for autonomy in the conduct of their own lives. Blaise comes to see his life with these women operating in what he calls "phases" and "cycles," but just as within mechanical devices such as clocks, there are also movements and countermovements within each relationship and each phase between attraction and repulsion, love and hate, that determine the characters' domestic arrangements, conversation and argument, love-making and aggression. Like fixed wheels, they automatically repeat the pat-

Edwin Kenney, Jr. teaches English at Colby College, Maine. He is the author of Elizabeth Bowen, *to be published by Bucknell University Press.*

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terns of their lives and their burdens of pain. In a state of flux, they desire stasis; in stasis, change. In alternating vital connection with one woman, Blaise seems to have discovered "reality" and "identity," his connection with the other appearing an illusion, his other self a lie.

Blaise is constitutionally self-deceptive; he does not wish to be deliberately dishonest, but he almost always is, especially when attempting to be truthful to one of his loves about the other. His good intentions are thwarted by his bad faith, and, despite his profession of analyst, his self-diagnosis is only an attempt at self-accommodation: "He led a double life. Did that make him a liar? He did not feel a liar. He was a man of two truths, since both of these lives were valuable and true." By making Blaise a kind of fraudulent analyst who fails to understand or help himself, Miss Murdoch emphasizes the lack of perception and sensitivity involved in applying formulas to the behavior of human beings. But at the same time she orders the lives of her characters and their relations according to these formulas that seem, once thus perceived, "mechanical." The language, dream content and method of this novel are psychoanalytical, and yet the book seems to want to deny this "machinery" for understanding human life.

Blaise's self-diagnosis, then, is ineffective, even as a momentary release from tension; it is feebly self-deceiving, and, as its effects wear off, the symptoms come back more insistently than ever because nothing has been done to remove their cause. Successful therapy is therefore not achieved by any of the characters in *The Sacred and Profane Love Machine*, and all of the psychologizing only makes this unsatisfied need more intensely felt. As Harriet says, they are all victims; only violence can break the machinery of their lives together. So Iris Murdoch the novelist provides the easy, arbitrary act of violence that has nothing to do with the hostilities among the characters and that takes the place of therapy in this book. Harriet is killed so that Blaise and Emily may marry. The novel remains static, without a real conclusion, only an end. All that emerges from the regrouping caused by Harriet's removal is Iris Murdoch's insistence that people ought not to suffer in excess. Miss Murdoch has never admired suffering; she admires most those who refuse to suffer, who can dispossess the dead, who know that personal relationships change, who go on however they can.

On another level of the novel's structure of meaning, Blaise and Monty represent this protective self-love, both

ORDINANCE ON GETTING BETTER

The signs indicate
that you are getting much better.
For example, you are not nearly as prone
to feeling abandoned
when friends don't telephone
for weeks on end. You understand
their delinquency has nothing to do
with the bond between you.
It doesn't mean anything definite
about your character. You know
it is not a judgment; they have not
found you out. Your suffering,
these days, is not grand opera.
You have changed enormously.
A good case in point occurred only
this morning when you noticed
half your face was missing.
It is significant that you were able
to remark to yourself
how many people live decently
with half a face. You might remember
that just a short time ago
you would have been distraught
at such an occurrence. Now
you appreciate your gifts,
nor do you label as crazy
the people who want to be close to you.
This is all because you are better.

You must not be distracted
by your dreams. It doesn't matter
that in your dreams
trains pull away just as you reach
the platform, or that swimmers
strike out for the open sea
without you. Try to forget
that house in your dreams,
the light bulb hanging
in the room you live in,
and the newspapers covering the windows.

Naomi Lazard

ROOFTOP ORDINANCE

ref. no. 161/0404

You are one of the lucky inhabitants
of this building. As you know
it is the finest of its type,
designed by an internationally famous
architect, constructed by a prestigious
contractor. This is also
the world's tallest building.
Precautions are necessary
when you use the roof.
Do not over-exert yourself:
walk out upon it as slowly as you can,
then sit down or better still,
lower yourself to a prone position.
If you have a medical history
see your physician first.
He will advise you
regarding your safe exposure.
You will learn to find the roof enjoyable
if you follow instructions.

Notice: the roof has been transformed
into a garden for your pleasure.
No effort was stinted on the landscaping.
You must resign yourself
to the vertigo; there was nothing
we could do about the motion of the earth.
Keep your eyes on your happy neighbors,
reclining in the chairs provided,
spinning gaily, lurching
in the wind.

Naomi Lazard

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profane and sacred. Iris Murdoch is fascinated by refusals and denials of life, especially when they seem not pathetic but godly; her books almost always include a character who is intelligent, dispassionate and powerful in his imperious will to manipulate others. Monty is this character in *The Sacred and Profane Love Machine*. He is the one who rightly, if coldly, sees Blaise as "a sort of pitiable walking danger, like something radio-active." Monty "might be a very shoddy artist, but he had the artist's capacity to cheat," and this "cheating" is the fictive ordering of the needs, passions and relations of others without sharing in them and without accepting responsibility for them.

What distinguishes Monty, the "king of cynics," the "dreaming god, making things happen in a sort of a trance," from the sinister gods in Miss Murdoch's other works is that in this novel she reveals the desperate human suffering underlying Monty's denial of life, and therefore she seems to credit his imperiousness as a legitimate response to suffering. To avoid passing his pain on to others, as Blaise does, Monty seeks to remove himself from his fellow beings, cruelly rejecting the possibilities offered by love. In contrast to Blaise's "dreary old historical self," Monty, the author within the fiction, makes himself into a God whose delight at his own superiority is revealed in a contemptuous irony, which he says is the "concealment of an author's glee."

Iris Murdoch the novelist is somewhat like Monty in her attitude toward her characters in this novel. As the ultimate *deus ex machina*, she has detached herself from the anguished entanglements of human love by reducing them to the automatic responses of the most banal psychoanalytic theory. But her irony is not gleeful, and this suggests that she is not self-satisfied—her ironic intelligence is too skeptical for that. This gives hope that she may return in future novels to her early comic ideal of "the apprehension of the absurd irreducible uniqueness of people and of their relations with each other." □

DANCE / Nancy Goldner

It was brave of Robert Joffrey to introduce Kurt Jooss's *The Big City* into the Joffrey Ballet's repertory, side by side with *The Green Table*. I am happy to report that it was not foolhardy. As the only Jooss ballet in performance until now, *The Green Table* had achieved a single-child status that makes additions to the family difficult. *The Green Table* is also special for its overtly political and grand theme: war is stupid, it says, cooked up by self-serving diplomats. *The Big City* has no such important theme, although its political point of view is also unique in the dance repertory. It divides society not into the good and the bad or the happy and the unhappy but into the poor and the rich. Nor is *The Big City* bolstered by such a powerful dance concept as *The Green Table*'s figure of death. Yet it holds its own, I think, because it is so perfectly made.

The Big City is short and tart. Within about twelve minutes, Jooss establishes a plot, nails down an assortment of character types, and shows us three aspects of city life—all of it angled by class consciousness, and all of it danced out. The first scene presents a mélange of types; the time of day is possibly lunch hour. Everyone is on the run in Jooss's typically semi-naturalistic, semi-stylized fashion. In this first episode the step is a combination of a *pas de bourrée* and a shuffle off to Buffalo, a mix of ballet and social dancing that continues through the rest of the piece. This particular jazzy trot is a background against which specific gestures and incidents stand out, and Jooss manipulates the cast like cardboard cutouts so that the audience is sure to see what he wants it to see, mainly, a triangle that is developing between a working girl, whose light-colored dress (as distinct from those of several drably garbed factory workers) says that she is a secretary or other upwardly mobile type; a young working man whose hoofing, time-to-kill style of moving suggests that he may be out of work; and a gentleman in cape and top hat who doesn't need to work (Jooss calls him the Libertine).

With the panoramic view neatly laid out, Jooss slides into his theme that rich is rich, poor is poor, and never the twain. The Libertine, with tinseled present in hand, follows the working girl into the ghetto (the workers' quarters, Jooss calls it). The children point fingers; their mothers cast suspicious glances and protectively huddle the little ones under their arms. These women step calmly, even with dignity, and their castigating looks at one whom they take for an invader of their turf have all the more authority for their proud chests. The Libertine vaguely toys with his cuffs; the girl returns in a new dress and waltzes off with him to the dance hall. Now Jooss changes his mode of storytelling from narration to representation, from the specific to the general. Through a kind of cinematic dissolve, he juxtaposes the dance halls of the rich and poor, the first hectic and sequined, the second decorous and relatively dull. The constant factor in both worlds is the working man, in pursuit of the girl he lost to the Libertine. In the second, final dissolve, back into the rich dance hall, the girl loses the Libertine in the crowd and is not reclaimed by the boy. Encounters in city life are chancy, and young people on the lookout for romance and companionship can't retrace their steps.

The Big City ends with the young man alone in the dance hall, his body thrusting forward toward an anonymous space of time and place, perhaps the next day. It's the same stance that concluded the first scene, only that then the stance anticipated true love's victory. The mock-heroic echo of the originally heroic posture is *The Big City*'s departing lemon twist. The small irony of the final image and the ironic overtone it thus sheds on what came before it is not as astringent as *The Green Table*'s last scene back at the negotiating table, but the notion that life repeats itself in a generally downhill spiral saves the ballet from being just another whimsical slice of life. It has some of the strength and piquancy of the cynic's shrug.

The Big City's mass of event, character and idea roller-skates by as noiselessly as Alexandre Tansman's piano score, which out-Porters Cole Porter. The ballet is so deftly put together that one doesn't bother to look for choreographic invention, or even choreography. The ballet-social dancing base is, in fact, a base, a means of transporting people into the right groupings and of establishing a gestalt of tempo. Its virtue is its semi-invisibility. In terms of specific movement, which is what one normally looks for in dancing, the only outstanding elements are the pantomimic gestures and postures whose function is to telegraph information. Where does this dancey pantomime stand in the ballet-modern dance scheme? Jooss is sometimes regarded as a connecting link between ballet and the modern dance movement that was developing in Germany between the wars. His links with ballet are easy to see, though his use of the technique is rudimentary, perhaps on purpose. He likes to disconnect the flow of ballet and stiffen its back, and he rejects ballet's mime in favor of the pantomime's mime, but these changes don't automatically eject him into the territory of modern dance. Fact is, Jooss's works look like no other surviving works. If he is in any

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tradition, it would seem to be that of the French mimes and the school of actors who find their way into character through external characteristics. The part of recognition is from the outside to the inside, whereas the revolutionary idea of the modern dance was to reverse the path. In *The Big City* and much of *The Green Table*, the silhouette is what matters most. It is without muscular tension and is descriptive rather than evocative. Two exceptions are the dances for the death figure in *The Green Table* and the working man's forward thrust, which is one reason the choreography for these characters dominates their respective ballets. Jooss's achievement, more directorial than choreographic, is to hit on the right silhouettes, to keep them moving about the stage with speed and economy, and to strike a perfect balance between background and foreground action.

If Jooss's style can be attached to any kind of entertainment, it is the movies. I have already mentioned the cinematic dissolves from one dance hall to another, but in fact the entire ballet is as seamless as a movie. The crowd thickens and thins, events happen, locales change before one's eyes, yet so swiftly and smoothly that one is not fully aware that the shifts are taking place. As in the movies, *The Big City* carries you along a little faster than you can keep up and in one instance, in the ghetto scene, takes you to a place before you grasp why you are there. Not until after a dance for children does one understand that there's a plot link between midtown and slum. Jooss developed a scheme of stage lighting that is also cinematic. By keeping the peripheries of the stage in thick darkness, so that the dancers may materialize out of thin air instead of the wings, he shares the movies' antipathy to spatial boundaries and its love of visual fantasy. Its sense of period quite aside, *The Big City* is in many ways the dream allegory that Chaplin never made.

But of course *The Big City*'s sense of period can't be put aside; it's the 1930s, or what one imagines the 1930s to feel and look and sound like, all the way. The Joffrey dancers treat it with a remarkable lack of self-consciousness, which more than makes up for any possible lack of authenticity. William Whitener is especially convincing as the working fellow. His breezy sidlings, crooked smiles and insinuating good will recall Ray Bolger, a fine model for a dancer to evoke. Because the Joffrey dancers approach their work modestly and straight on, a novelty such as Jooss's is plausible, believable. So, for the same reasons, are the 1950s Robbins ballets and some of the Massine ballets.

However, on those occasions when more than modesty is needed—for something like Joffrey's *Pas des Déesses*, revived this season—the Joffrey dancers are more dwarfed than unpretentious, more immature than youthful. *Pas des Déesses*, a lovely tribute to and intelligent analysis of the 19th-century manner, needs to be deepened by cross-currents of contemporary manner. But the Joffrey women are better at getting someone else's manners than at expressing their own. In their own right, they are not interesting; which is to say that, although their muscles move efficiently, they don't move with imagination. No Joffrey dancer commands space, prolongs time, or conjures up a metaphor of himself or herself. To be deprived of magic tricks is no fun for an audience, but a second aspect of the situation is more severe: the dancers' limitations put severe limitations on the repertory. Contemporary ballets about the rhythms, timbres and muscle-colors of movement and music cannot get their due at the Joffrey right now. (Arpino's ballets are works of pure dance, but only in the sense that they're not about birds or neurotics; in any case, they don't allow the dancers breathing space, much less real space to move in.) Joffrey's archaeological digs into the dance repertory are intelligent, imaginative, instructive and, unfortunately, necessary. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

When I reviewed the British National Theatre's adaptation of Molière's *The Misanthrope* from London (*The Nation*, August 13, 1973), I spoke of it as "bright entertainment," mentioned its *chic* and concluded that it lacked, because it did not attempt, the tension and indignation inherent in Molière's comedy: it was "a shrewd and pretty graph" of the original.

It is now here at the St. James Theatre, and these opinions may still hold for those who have not previously seen the production. But I cannot forbear from stating that for me they do not. I am not certain how and why the transformation has taken place but I am sure that it has. The tripping or dance-like pace characteristic of Molière's writing has now been slowed to a dull deliberateness. The formerly shimmering surface has, except for Tanya Moiseiwitsch's *haute couture* setting and costumes, lost its lightness. Molière's fluency, the sustained grace of the dialogue's texture, are now hammered down point by point in what strikes the ear as a series of pedantic blows.

Can it be that the very able director, John Dexter, warned the cast that Americans might not catch all the lines if rapidly spoken in an English accent? Has tiredness set in? Or does the size of the St. James—much larger than the Old Vic's house—contribute to the ponderous effect? I cannot say: the fact remains that while I was in the main pleased with *The Misanthrope* in London—in which Alec McCowen and Diana Rigg appeared as they still do here—I was now bored by it.

The Royal Shakespeare's production of Maxim Gorky's *Summerfolk* opened at the Brooklyn Academy of Music while I was in India and I was not able to see it until its final performance. Though the company's season has now closed, I feel I ought to say something about this particular play because of its merit and also because its performance was widely admired.

Summerfolk is one of a group of plays Gorky devoted to the unnerved and disheartened middle class of Russia between 1902 and 1917. There are at least nine of them, of which only two have been seen in prominent New York production: *Enemies*, written in 1906, and *Summerfolk*, written in 1904. (Another such play, *Odd People*, 1910, one of the most "amusing," was very well done by the Long Wharf Theatre of New Haven under the title *Country People*.)

All these plays—especially *Summerfolk* and *Enemies*—point to an inevitable revolution. But they are not, as some now maintain, "propaganda pieces." Gorky knew the milieu intimately and was not "antagonistic" to its people. If his portrait is cruder and harsher than Chekhov's, it is not simply because he was not so fine an artist as his senior but because Chekhov wrote of an earlier period and Gorky of a time when the disarray of the middle class and Russian society in general had become much more shattering.

Summerfolk, Gorky is careful to stress, is not a play about the Russian intelligentsia (*Country People* is that) but about men and women who, once poor, have grown moderately prosperous. They now find themselves with nowhere to go; the road ahead is blocked by state and church. They are bored, distempered, without real hope or fresh ideas. They hardly even dream; they drink, philander, relieve themselves in cynicism or in a rootless mysticism. A writer, vigorously aspiring in his youth, has lost his faith and with unconcealed shamelessness mucks about in his own

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and his friends' melancholy puddle. An engineer is totally uninterested in what he has built and neglects his work. His wife deceives him without pleasure. The young become destructively restive. Faithful wives are overwrought because of the stupid, complacent inertia of their husbands. An aging maiden comforts herself in a cushion of boneless poetics and musical reverie. A wealthy peasant landowner from Siberia combines muscle with horse sense because he has labored on the land of a still undeveloped area, and a woman doctor retains her sanity and urges escape into constructive paths away from the morass of mediocre safety; though she too suffers, she works usefully. There is a ludicrous move toward suicide and murderous gestures are adumbrated.

The canvas is overcrowded and diffuse, so that it appears to want focus. Yet everything rings true. The play's acrid humor provokes laughter as much as pain. Gorky's compassion is unsentimental. Above all, we find a wealth of observation and sentience in the almost documentary notation of personal and social facts. We very nearly cry out for an alteration of the described condition and one senses that Gorky, while "philosophically" awaiting change, does not distort his vision or mock his people because of impatience.

There was much to praise in the Royal Shakespeare Company presentation, especially in the performances by Margaret Tyzack as the hard-pressed woman physician, Susan Fleetwood as the unhappy lady poetaster, Tony Church as the bibulous engineer, Estelle Kohler as the martyred wife who finally breaks through her bonds. During the first act I had been seated in the sixth row of the "mezzanine," deep in the immense space of the Brooklyn Academy of Music, from which all the actors looked like midgets and all I could be impressed (or depressed) by was the dim sonority of their over-precise diction. When I moved down to the orchestra floor, close to the stage, I observed the excellence of certain details of David Jones's staging and of the acting. But what struck me most throughout was that the play's mood had become entirely British.

I do not refer to the English speech but to a certain hard-edged brittleness in the overall effect. This was especially marked in Ian Richardson's much lauded characterization of the disillusioned writer. He seemed to have stepped in from Bloomsbury! There was something thin, bloodless, pettily superior and altogether disobliging about him. True, the man has lost his nerve and marrow, but he was once the hope of those who sought a breakthrough into spiritual and social freedom. An artist, though perhaps essentially a "romantic," his depressed readers were justified in expecting and demanding from him a liberating call, an enhancement of being. Richardson's writer was simply nasty. And that, I believe, is counter-indicated by the text and, more decisively, by the Russian temperament.

The most "pooped out" person in Gorky (or Chekhov), even the rare villain or the vicious, has more fiber and heart, more density of "flesh" and soul, more vulnerably quivering humanity, than Richardson's writer possesses—and this holds true for many of the other characters. The Russian, even in his disquiet, in his decline into rottenness, is still a creature who once was a man. He is hardly ever defective through lack of substance, but through a diminution or corruption of a total virility; he almost always remains *full bodied*. This basic quality—ever present in Gogol's satires, in Dostoevsky's lacerations, in Tolstoy's cautionary lamentations and "anti-heroes," and still there in Chekhov and Gorky—was for the most part missing in the RSC's *Summerfolk*.

But then—and here is the paradox—the production is quite right for the situation and temper of present-day England. Far more "picturesquely," metaphorically and convincingly, it does what most of the "angry young" English playwrights have been trying to do since 1956. *Summerfolk* as given here is the best "*English*" play of the past two decades.

To descend from the comparatively sublime to the utterly ridiculous—to the bottom of the barrel in fact—it is worth being reminded that *The Rocky Horror Show* (Belasco Theatre), which I thought originated on Sunset Boulevard, actually is an English product.

The Rocky Horror Show is deliberately sloppy: tackiness is its style. Compared to this most recent expression of English collapse, the "Beats" were idealists and poets. They wanted to remove themselves from the suffocation of middle-class conformity. The creators of this piece—*The Rocky Horror Show*—Richard O'Brien, the director Jim Sharman, and the leading player Tim Curry, who made the show a huge success in London and Hollywood, have cut themselves off from any sort of dream to sink in raucous abandon to a realm without memory of anything more elevated than the old-fashioned science-fiction thriller. It is a domain of little joy though much ambivalent sexual activity, where little distinction is made between male and female and where refuse is the natural resting place. Costumes are by choice ugly and tattered, music is pointedly jagged, aural and visual shock is supposed to make for a special sort of euphoria. There is no protest in this: it is embraced as a fact, something that irremediably *is*, a celebration of garbage. And note, furthermore, that the show as offered at the Belasco is arranged, cabaret style, with separate tables at which drinks, peanuts and popcorn are served (some food and dancing follow the performance) and the whole is relatively tidied up. It is all perhaps an image of where civilization has landed itself.

A healthy atmosphere pervades *The Lieutenant*, a "New Rock Opera" by Gene Curty, Nitra Scharfman, Chuck Strand (Lyceum Theatre). It deals with the My Lai massacre, certainly a subject worth dramatic interpretation.

Socialist Revolution

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Projected in song and dance, the author's point is that the lieutenant, an ordinary American boy with little education or secure position, was taught to obey orders and thus, as a soldier, to kill. The burden of guilt is placed on the military establishment rather than on the individual. This is not wholly satisfactory as ideology but for the moment it may pass.

Every word of this "opera" is easily understood—a rare virtue even in musical comedy. The generally young company lends itself to its task with likable zest and considerable agility: it acts the "numbers" well and prances about (or dances) in attractive exhilaration. Eddie Mekka as the Lieutenant, Walt Hunter as his superior officer, Burt Rodriguez as the Prosecutor and Gordon Grody as the Defense Attorney are particularly effective.

But the combination of pop jollity with the sort of social significance here intended obviates truly serious consideration of the material. The endeavor never becomes as pathetic or rousing as it should be. □

ART / Lawrence Alloway

University and college museums often find themselves pulled between the art department's desire to use their resources for teaching with real objects (as a relief from endless slides) and the museum staff's inclination to build up more aesthetically substantial collections. The Allen Memorial Art Museum at Oberlin College, Ohio, has become well-known for its persistent commitment to American art, of which it now has a small but discriminating collection. Not least of several reasons for the Allen's excellence among campus-based museums is the contribution of Ellen Johnson, who is both a teacher at the college and the museum's honorary curator. She will retire soon and the college has proposed a monument to her in the form of a new museum wing to be called "The Ellen Johnson Gallery of Modern Art." Eighty-five per cent of the necessary funds is pledged and a benefit exhibition and auction is planned in New York to help raise the remainder ($500,000).

This column is not usually much concerned with mixed exhibitions and even less with auctions, but the significance of the Johnson project demands that an exception be made. Works by Philip Guston, Jasper Johns, Roy Lichtenstein, Claes Oldenburg, Robert Rauschenberg and Frank Stella, among others, will be on view at the Castelli and Sonnabend Galleries (both 420 West Broadway) during the first week of April and auctioned on the 9th at Parke-Bernet. This cross section of 1960s styles is a tribute to the particular respect and liking the art world has for Ellen Johnson.

The interrelations of art criticism and art history are peculiar to the United States; I am aware of no European parallels. The most conspicuous result of the exchange between the academy and art criticism is a solidification of art critical methods. The subject matter of criticism has stayed the same, i.e., the discussion of new art, but it is treated more systematically, including footnotes. The writing of Ellen Johnson reverses this: it is not scholarly form brought to unruly criticism that she shows but the warmth and enthusiasm of involved criticism brought to academic forms. One of her main outlets has been the *Allen Memorial Art Museum Bulletin* in which she has written admiringly and early on various young artists. Three times during the 1960s she arranged a show of "Three Young Americans," and each was the occasion for a *Bulletin* article. In 1963 it was Joan Mitchell, Rauschenberg and Oldenburg; in 1965, Charles Hinman, Larry Poons and Neil Williams; and in 1968 Jack Kruger, Bruce Nauman and Alan Saret. The timing was just right: early Pop art, prompt Hard Edge and immediate recognition of "new" sculpture. Her sense of the contemporaneous shows clearly when she refers to Nauman as "evidently rooted in the past," the past being identified with Marcel Duchamp. The convergence of personal contact with artists, a scholarly firmness of form and early contributions to the field is rare, and the combination deserves the tribute it is being paid.

Because much of her writing originates in arranging exhibitions, and since that entails studio visits and negotiations with artists, Johnson's writing rests on a firm commitment to the artists. When she described Oldenburg's "Giant Three-Way Plug," installed on the campus at Oberlin, as being "as inert as a turnip or an elephant turd" she used words close to the artist's own thought processes. To this sympathetic accord with artists must be added a generous view of the social role of art as a heartening model of superior human attainment. A fine confidence in art itself emanates from Johnson's pages, and that is not a routine attribute of art writers. Kurt W. Forster put this rhetorical question: "Could it be that art history as a compensatory, better history—in contrast to the bloody struggle and chaotic events of history—ascribes to art a powerful, redemptive role?" (*New Literary History*, Spring, 1972.) To which I think Johnson could answer *yes*. In an article on Mitchell, Rauschenberg and Oldenburg she was willing to define each one's work as standing for "one of the several new kinds of beauty which continue to enliven our art." Thus her writing constitutes a humanistic view of art serving society by its diverse styles. Her eloquence is based not on fanatic support for a narrow definition of modernity (which excludes more than it admits) but on a principle of highly sympathetic enfolding. She dismisses the fallacy of critical thought by which single individuals or movements are nominated as the most representative of a period, in which a current personality is treated as an aesthetic norm.

Another way in which she has reconciled art history and criticism is by her fluency as a writer. Her bibliography exceeds the art historian's normal output, and a selection of her essays will be published by Penguin Books this year.

Johnson's earlier writing is able but her special reputation does not rest on it. However, one piece that she wrote in 1955 anticipates a strong later interest. She took a 1911 still life by Picasso and analyzed it for the purpose of recovering and identifying the abstracted objects that had been absorbed into the painting. She concluded: "The artist has made no effort to conceal, but rather to reveal, the process from representation to transformation." This sense of the object persists in very illuminating ways in her essays on Pop art, in which she defines, with particular canniness, the function of objects in Dine, Johns, Oldenburg, Rauschenberg and George Segal, not to mention Cornell. She traces a poetics of the obdurate object, taken from the factual world and inserted into an aesthetic context. She registers an object's persistency through all the stages of its protracted assimilation. In the 1960s, objects and quoted materials like Lichtenstein's comic strips were almost interchangeable, in that both appeared to violate aesthetic decorum, and Johnson is no less convincing when she discusses "sign-systems" as if they, too, were objects. □

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

ACROSS

8 The result of hearing "Yes, We have No Bananas" time after time? (9,6)
9 and 14 down The pastry cook might not like this simple comparison. (2,4,2,3)
10 Putting out a sort of notice about the number of geese a-laying? (8)
11 Caledonian tax. (4)
13 Get in and get back to the meeting, essentially. (10)
15 The sheer strake has a new lug fitted to it. (7)
16 Certainly not the way for roofers to go to sleep on the job. (4,3)
19 Market spaces, but not usually for public display. (10)
21 Repeat part of the chorus? (4)
22 Possibly according to the rule in some families, but with candy its ingredients are different. (8)
24 What the dressmaker might have to do is free, perhaps. (3,3)
26 People might resort to the switch if they do, but it's no way to insure brightness. (4,3,3,5)

DOWN

1 An irritable state to escape? It's probably a fair distance. (5-7,3)
2 The 12 here is leaner. (4)
3 Take the part of the Conqueror, familiarly, according to the program. (8)
4 The appearances of caps set awry? (7)
5 Like Canute, seeking for the truth. (6)
6 Don't eat so quickly! (4)
7 Academic think-tank? That's at least one opinion. (6,2,7)
12 One might have pull at the bank, but not the type found in 2. (5)
14 See 9 across
17 Straightens out what the old *NATION* subscriber does to certain reprint puzzles. (8)
18 Act most peculiarly, like certain reputed fence-sitters. (7)
20 Approve of a Democrat, if you take part. (6)
23 A relative of the tuna variety. (4)
25 Neat part of the curriculum, in short. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1577

ACROSS: 1 Stiff; 4 Used up; 11 Verbena; 12 Lorelei; 13 Cherubini; 15 Goes to the head; 17 Box the compass; 22 Ideal; 24 Ethiopian; 25 Headman; 26 Narrows; 27 and 14 Parlor games; 28 Essay. DOWN: 2 Torpedo; 3 Feel upset; 5 Sprig; 6 Dilemma; 7 Prissy; 8 Evict; 9 Varicose veins; 10 Sleight-of-hand; 16 Hippocras; 18 Open-air; 19 Spinoza; 20 Mishap; 21 Gnash; 23 Limbo.

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

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